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## ☞ Objective

Asian Journal of Humanities and Social Innovation (AJHSI) is a journal in the humanities and social sciences. It aims to promote research and publish research articles, academic articles, review articles, and book reviews for scholars, researchers, lecturers, students at all levels, and interested persons in the dimensions of Sociologies, Anthropologies, Humanities, Social Sciences, Education, Business Administration, Politics, Public Administration, Development, Tourism, and other areas in Social Sciences. Articles that are considered for publication must be reviewed by at least 2 out of 3 qualified persons (Peer Review). Only English articles are considered for publication. Submitted works must not have been published or are under consideration by qualified persons for publication in other journals. Authors must strictly comply with the criteria for submitting academic or research articles for publication in the journal, and the referencing system must be in accordance with the criteria of the journal.

The views and opinions expressed in journal articles are the responsibility of the authors of the articles and are not the opinions of the editorial team. The editorial team does not reserve the right to copy but requires references to show the source.

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# Editorial

Asian Journal of Humanities and Social Innovation (AJHSI) is the fourth issue of the year 2024 with a total of 5 articles, 2 research articles and 3 academic articles. The journal is currently developing and improving its format and main issues to meet the journal quality assessment criteria in the TCI database to support the assessment from the Thai Journal Citation Index (TCI). In order to ensure that the quality of the articles meets international conditions and rules, it provides opportunities for scholars, researchers, and students at all levels to publish academic articles, research articles, review articles, and book reviews. The editorial team has followed the principled process of publishing articles according to the criteria of the Office of the Higher Education Commission in all respects.

The editors of Asian Journal of Humanities and Social Innovation (AJHSI) would like to thank the authors, members and readers for their interest and trust in our journal. We sincerely hope that the selected articles will be of benefit to all readers. The editors would like to thank all the experts who have kindly read and suggested improvements to the research articles to improve their academic quality.

Finally, the editors sincerely hope that the contents of this journal will be of some use to readers. If readers have any suggestions for improving this journal to make it more complete, the editors will gladly accept them.

**Editor-In-Chief**

# Contents

# Enhancing Ethical Leadership in Basic Education Administration Based on the Four Brahmavihāras: A Case Study of the Khon Kaen Primary Educational Service Area Office 1[*]

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## Abstract

This research aims to 1. Study the administration of educational institutions 2. Compare the administration of educational institutions. Data were collected from a sample of 413 people, by specifying the sample size according to the Crazy and Morgan table and using a simple random sampling method. The research instrument was a rating scale questionnaire with a reliability of .94. The statistics used to analyze the data were frequency, percentage, mean, and standard deviation. Hypotheses were tested by using the t-test (Independent Sample) and the one-way analysis of variance (F-test (One-Way ANOVA)). When differences were found, pairwise comparisons were made with the least significant difference (LSD).

The research results found that:

1. The administration of educational institutions according to the principles of the four divine states in basic education institutions found that overall, the average value was at a high level. When classified by each aspect, it was found that the aspect with the highest average value was the aspect of general administration according to the principles of the four divine states, followed by the aspect of personnel administration according to the principles of the four divine states and the aspect of academic administration according to the principles of the four divine states, respectively. The aspect with the lowest average value was the aspect of budget administration according to the principles of the four divine states.

2. The results of the comparison of the administration of educational institutions according to the principles of the four divine states classified by educational status and work experience of the sample groups, overall and by aspect, showed no differences in practice.

## Introduction

The National Education Act (No. 3) B.E. 2553, Section 37, stipulates that the administration and management of basic education by adhering to the educational area, taking into account the level of basic education, the number of educational institutions, the population, culture, and appropriateness in other aspects, including the management of basic education for persons with physical, mental, intellectual, emotional, social, communication, and learning disabilities, or those with physical disabilities or disabilities, by organizing basic education in the form of non-formal education or informal education, and for those with special abilities, including organizing distance education and organizing education that provides services in many educational areas (Royal Gazette, National Education Act (No. 3) B.E. 2553)

The study that can develop learning and use it as a tool to change the foundation of knowledge in educational development to be both efficient and effective, decentralizing the administration and management of education in terms of academics, budget, personnel administration and general administration to the committee and the area education office and educational institutions in the educational area directly (Prawet Wasi, 2001). The administration of educational institutions is carried out by the school administrators with support from representatives of parents, teachers, community organizations, local government organizations, alumni of the educational institution, representatives of monks or representatives of other religions in the area (Khaemmani, 2006).

Therefore, the researcher is interested in studying the administration of educational institutions according to the principles of the four divine states in basic educational institutions, Office of the Primary Educational Service Area, Khon Kaen Area 1, to be used as information and guidelines for considering improvements or developments in educational institution administration, which can be integrated with Buddhist principles, especially the principles of the four divine states, to create further efficiency.

## Objective

1. To study the administration of educational institutions according to the principles of the four divine states in basic educational institutions under the Office of the Primary Educational Service Area, Khon Kaen Area 1.

2. To compare the administration of educational institutions according to the principles of the four divine states in basic educational institutions under the Office of the Primary Educational Service Area, Khon Kaen Area 1, classified by job position, educational qualifications, and work experience.

## Literature review

The concept of ethical leadership in educational administration is pivotal to cultivating integrity, compassion, and equity in schools. Ethical leadership, as defined by Brown and Treviño (2006), involves the demonstration and promotion of normatively appropriate conduct through personal actions and interpersonal relationships. In the context of Thai educational administration, the integration of

Buddhist moral principles, especially the **Four Brahmavihāras**—loving-kindness (mettā), compassion (karuṇā), empathetic joy (muditā), and equanimity (upekkhā)— offers a culturally grounded framework to guide leaders' ethical behavior (Phra Dhammapitaka, 2007).

Scholars such as Hallinger and Heck (2010) emphasize that school leadership must be value-driven and community-sensitive, especially in basic education settings where ethical dilemmas are frequent. The Brahmavihāras provide a spiritual-ethical compass that complements administrative rationality. For example, mettā fosters inclusive policies and non-discrimination, while karuṇā supports responsive care for students with special needs or socio-economic hardships (Sujato, 2015).

Research conducted by Srisura and Phukamchanoad (2021) revealed that school administrators who practiced ethical principles inspired greater trust and cooperation among teachers, which led to improvements in both teaching effectiveness and student behavior. Similarly, Uthayophas (2019) studied the application of Buddhist principles in educational leadership and found that administrators who embody the Brahmavihāras gained higher moral authority and were more effective in conflict resolution and team-building.

Furthermore, Thai scholars such as Chantarasombat (2013) advocate for the institutionalization of Buddhist ethics in educational leadership development programs. He argues that incorporating these moral dimensions not only enhances individual leadership practice but also nurtures a holistic school culture rooted in compassion and justice. The relevance of this approach is particularly significant in northeastern Thailand (Isan), where Buddhist values deeply influence social and institutional norms (Nimnuan, 2018).

In sum, the integration of the Four Brahmavihāras into school leadership in the Thai context aligns with both international ethical leadership theories and indigenous moral frameworks. This literature suggests that ethical leadership guided by Brahmavihāra principles may lead to more inclusive, empathetic, and morally resilient educational environments, particularly within basic education institutions.

**Methodology**

1. Research Design This research used quantitative research methodology with survey methodology using statistical methods to analyze data and present descriptive analysis.

2. Population and sample The population consisted of 1,694 school administrators and teachers in basic education institutions, Office of the Primary Education Service Area 1, Khon Kaen (Information System for Educational Administration, 2017). The sample consisted of 413 school administrators and teachers in basic education institutions, Office of the Primary Education Service Area 1, Khon Kaen (Information System for Educational Administration, 2017).

3. Research instruments In this research, the researcher used a questionnaire to collect data on school administration according to the principles of the Four Divine Abodes in basic education institutions. The research was conducted under the Office of the Primary Education Area, Khon Kaen Area 1. It was a survey research with a checklist format, a 5-level rating scale questionnaire, and an open-ended questionnaire, consisting of 3 sections as follows: Section 1: General information of the respondents regarding their status, educational qualifications, and work experience, in the form of a

checklist. Section 2: A questionnaire on the administration of educational institutions according to the principles of the Four Divine Abodes in basic education institutions under the Office of the Primary Education Area, Khon Kaen Area 1, in the form of a 5-level rating scale based on the Likert scale (Bunchom Srisat, 2011). Section 3: A questionnaire on guidelines for promoting the administration of educational institutions according to the principles of the Four Divine Abodes in basic education institutions under the Office of the Primary Education Area, Khon Kaen Area 1, in the form of an open-ended questionnaire consisting of 4 aspects: the principle of loving-kindness, the principle of compassion, the principle of sympathetic joy, and the principle of equanimity.

4. Data collection The researcher proceeded with data collection according to the following steps:

4.1 Request a letter to collect data from the Graduate School Center, Mahachulalongkornrajavidyalaya University, regarding the appointment of experts, request permission from relevant agencies and send it to the sample group.

4.2 The researcher sent the questionnaires to each sample group, 1 set, with a stamped envelope, correctly, so that the questionnaires could be returned to the researcher by mail and the researcher delivered some of the questionnaires himself and went to collect them himself.

4.3 Returned the 413 questionnaires to process the data by checking the accuracy and completeness of each questionnaire set.

4.4 Analyzed the 413 complete questionnaires according to the research objectives using a ready-made data analysis program.

5. Data analysis The researcher analyzed the data in the following order:

5.1 Analyze the general data of the respondents regarding their status and work experience by analyzing the number and percentage.

5.2 Analyze the level of school administration according to the principles of the four divine states in basic education institutions under the Office of the Primary Education Area, Khon Kaen, Area 1 by analyzing the mean ($\bar{x}$) and standard deviation (S.D.) both overall and in each aspect using the Likert method. Then compare with the criteria, average of 5 levels and interpret the results (Bunchom Srisat, 2011)

5.3 Analyze and compare the administration of educational institutions according to the principles of the four divine states in basic educational institutions under the Office of the Primary Educational Service Area, Khon Kaen, Area 1, classified by status by testing (t-test, independent samples)

5.4 Analyze and compare the administration of educational institutions according to the principles of the four divine states in basic education institutions under the Office of the Primary Educational Service Area, Khon Kaen, Area 1, classified by educational qualifications by testing (t-test, independent samples)

5.5 Analyze and compare the administration of educational institutions according to the principles of the four divine states in basic educational institutions under the Office of the Primary Educational Service Area, Khon Kaen, Area 1, classified by work experience by using a one-way analysis of variance (F-test, one way ANOVA). When differences are found, find the differences in pairs using the Scheffe' method.

5.6 Analyze the guidelines for administration of educational institutions according to the principles of the four divine states in basic educational institutions

Under the jurisdiction of the Khon Kaen Primary Educational Service Area Office, Area 1, 4 areas, by analyzing the number, finding the frequency value and analyzing the descriptive data.

**Results**

From the research results, there are issues that should be discussed as follows:

1. The administration of educational institutions according to the principles of the four divine states in basic education institutions found that overall, the average value was at a high level ($\bar{x}$= 4.30, S.D.= .51). This may be because the administrators of basic education institutions have applied the principles of the four divine states, namely loving-kindness, compassion, sympathetic joy, and equanimity, to the administration of basic education schools in terms of academic administration, budget administration, personnel administration, and general administration, which is consistent with the research of Buppa Pikulkaew (2010) who conducted research on "The application of the principles of the four divine states in the administration of academic affairs of administrators in private higher education institutions in Bangkok." The research results found that the application of the principles of the four divine states in the administration of academic affairs of administrators in terms of curriculum and teaching, measurement and evaluation, academic promotion, and academic planning was at a high level. Males and females with different work experiences had overall opinions in all aspects that were not different, while those with different ages and educational levels had overall opinions. There was a statistically significant difference at the .05 level. The analysis of important components found that the administrators mostly applied the principle of compassion, followed by loving-kindness, equanimity, and mudita, especially using the principle of compassion with measurement and evaluation, using the principle of compassion with academic planning, using the principle of mudita with academic promotion, and using the principle of equanimity with curriculum and teaching. This is consistent with Wichian Boonkla (2007) who conducted a research study on "A Study of the Use of the Four Divine Abodes by School Administrators in Basic Education Institutions Under the Office of the Surin Educational Service Area 3." The research results found that school administrators as a whole used the four divine abodes in their work to a high degree, and this was consistent with Nattaporn Phuthongngen (2012) who conducted a research study on the personnel management of school administrators according to the four divine abodes in the groups of schools under the Office of the Primary Educational Service Area 1 to 4 under the Office of the Primary Educational Service Area 1, Khon Kaen. It was found that overall, there were opinions at a high level.

2. The administration of educational institutions according to the principles of the four divine states in basic educational institutions classified by job positions were as follows:

2.1 Different job positions had different opinions on the administration of educational institutions according to the principles of the four divine states in basic educational institutions under the Office of the Primary Educational Service Area, Khon Kaen, Area 1, which was not in accordance with the hypothesis. This may be because the administration of basic educational institutions is participatory administration with diverse duties or mutual assistance, so the opinions on the administration of educational institutions according to the principles of the four divine

states in the administration of basic educational institutions under the Office of the Primary Educational Service Area, Khon Kaen, Area 1 were not different. This is consistent with the research of Thippaya Phatkhlangsaeng (2013) who studied the research on "Administration according to the principles of the four divine states of education of school directors in schools under the jurisdiction of Nakhon Sawan Municipality" and found that municipal teachers of different genders had different opinions on the administration of school administrators according to the principles of the four divine states of education in schools under the jurisdiction of the municipality. Nakhon Sawan Nakhon Sawan Province is not different but is not consistent with Mukda Anukanon (2012) who researched on the study of behavior according to the principles of the four divine states of mind of school administrators according to the perception of teachers in secondary schools under the Office of the Secondary Education Area 17. The research results found that 1. The morality of school administrators according to the principles of the four divine states of mind according to the perception of teachers is at a high level overall. The average ranking from highest to lowest are Mudita, Metta, Upekkha, and Karuna. 2. The results of comparing the morality of school administrators according to the principles of the four divine states of mind according to the perception of teachers classified by gender, work experience, and school size, both overall and in each aspect, found that they are different.

   2.2 Educational qualifications are different. School administration according to the principles of the four divine states of mind in basic education institutions is different, which is in line with the hypothesis set. This is because even though they have different educational qualifications, they have different opinions on school administration according to the principles of the four divine states of mind in basic education institutions under the Office of the Primary Education Area, Khon Kaen, Area 1, which is consistent with the research of Nam Oi Anusonthi (2011) who studied the research on "A study of the use of the four divine states of mind by school administrators under local administrative organizations in Kamphaeng Phet Province" The research results found that the overall use of the four divine states of mind by school administrators in all aspects of school administration was at a high level. The results of the comparison of opinions of teachers on the use of the four divine states of mind by school administrators under local administrative organizations in Kamphaeng Phet Province classified by gender and work experience found that teachers in schools under local administrative organizations in Kamphaeng Phet Province had different opinions on the use of the four divine states of mind by school administrators. The research of Wichian Boonkla (2007) studied the topic of "A study of the use of the four divine states of mind by school administrators in basic educational institutions under the Office of the Surin Educational Service Area 3". The research results found that school administrators as a whole used the four divine states of mind in their work to a high level. When considering each aspect, it was found that all aspects were at a high level, ranked from highest to lowest as follows: mudita, loving-kindness, equanimity, and compassion. The results of the comparison of the use of the four divine states of mind by school administrators found that school administrators and teachers had a perception of The overall use of the four divine abodes by school administrators is different. When considering each aspect, it was found that the use of the four divine abodes in every aspect is different.

2.3 Different working experiences have different opinions on the administration of educational institutions according to the principles of the four divine states in basic education institutions, which is not in accordance with the hypothesis. This may be because the school administrators and teachers have similar working experiences, which is consistent with the research of Thippaya Phasaklangsaeng (2013) who studied the topic of "Administration according to the principles of the four divine states of education of school directors in schools under the jurisdiction of Nakhon Sawan Municipality". It was found that the municipal teachers of different genders had different opinions on the administration of school administrators according to the principles of the four divine states of education in schools under the jurisdiction of Nakhon Sawan Municipality, Nakhon Sawan Province. This is not consistent with the research of Wichian Boonkla (2007) who studied the topic of "A study on the use of the four divine states of education by school administrators in basic education institutions under the jurisdiction of Surin Educational Service Area Office 3". The research results found that school administrators as a whole used the four divine states of education in their work to a high degree. When considering each aspect, it was found that all aspects were at a high level, ranked from highest to lowest as follows: Mudita, Metta, Upekkha and compassion: The comparative results of the use of the four divine abodes by basic education administrators found that school administrators and teachers had different perceptions of the use of the four divine abodes by school administrators overall. When considering each aspect, it was found that the use of the four divine abodes in every aspect was different.

**Discussion**

The findings revealed that the overall administration of basic education institutions in accordance with the Four Brahmavihāras—**Metta** (loving-kindness), **Karuna** (compassion), **Mudita** (sympathetic joy), and **Upekkha** (equanimity)—was at a **high level** ($\bar{x}$ = 4.30, S.D. = .51). This suggests that school administrators in the Khon Kaen Primary Educational Service Area Office 1 have successfully integrated Buddhist ethical principles into various domains of school management, including academic, budgetary, personnel, and general administration. These results are consistent with the study by **Buppa Pikulkaew (2010)**, who found that academic administration in private higher education institutions in Bangkok—particularly in curriculum development, assessment, and planning—reflected a strong implementation of Brahmavihāra-based ethics.

The data also indicate that **Karuna (compassion)** is the most frequently applied principle in school administration, especially in academic planning and student evaluation. This aligns with **Wichian Boonkla's (2007)** findings in the Surin Educational Service Area, which emphasized the high-level application of all four Brahmavihāras, with compassion being prominent. The application of **Mudita** (especially in academic promotion) and **Upekkha** (notably in curriculum and instruction) further highlights a nuanced, context-specific application of each divine abode based on the function of leadership roles.

Regarding **demographic factors**, the study showed **no significant differences in perceptions across job positions**, indicating a likely **collaborative or participatory leadership style** in schools, where both administrators and staff share ethical practices and mutual responsibilities. This is in line with **Thippaya Phatkhlangsaeng (2013)**, who found no significant differences among municipal teachers regarding the ethical behaviors of their administrators. However, this finding contrasts with **Mukda Anukanon (2012)**, whose research on secondary schools under the Office of Secondary Education Area 17 revealed that perceptions of administrators' ethical behavior varied significantly depending on gender, experience, and school size.

In terms of **educational qualifications**, the study found that individuals with different qualifications had **significantly different views** on Brahmavihāra-based administration. This supports the hypothesis and aligns with **Nam Oi Anusonthi's (2011)** study in Kamphaeng Phet, which reported similar differences based on educational background and gender. These variations might be attributed to differences in professional training or ethical sensitivity shaped by educational experiences.

Interestingly, **work experience did not significantly influence perceptions**, suggesting a possible **uniformity in administrative culture** within the area. This contradicts Boonkla (2007), who reported variations in perception based on experience, with differences in emphasis on Metta, Mudita, and Upekkha across experience levels. The findings highlight an essential characteristic of ethical leadership in Thai education: while rooted in Buddhist virtues, the effectiveness of Brahmavihāra-based administration depends on **how contextually and equitably these values are interpreted and applied**. This underscores the need for further leadership training programs that are sensitive to demographic diversity and capable of translating spiritual ethics into practical educational outcomes.

**New knowledge**

**Figure 1** New knowledge, 2024

**Quadrant 1: Job Positions (Top Left - Green)**
**Content:** "Job positions show high perception differences despite low application."
**Interpretation:** Even though divine-state practices are not heavily applied across different roles, perceptions vary widely, possibly due to role-based responsibilities or authority levels.

**Quadrant 2: Educational Qualifications (Top Right - Blue)**
**Content:** "Educational qualifications significantly influence perception of high application."
**Interpretation:** Those with different levels of education perceive the use of divine-state principles differently, with higher qualifications likely correlating with greater recognition of their use.

Quadrant 3: Work Experience (Bottom Left - Yellow-Green)
**Content:** "Work experience aligns with low application and perception differences."
**Interpretation:** Administrators and teachers with similar experience levels tend to perceive application similarly, suggesting a more uniform leadership environment over time.

**Quadrant 4: Overall Application (Bottom Right - Light Blue)**
**Content:**
"Overall application is high with minimal perception differences."
**Interpretation:** The general use of the Four Divine States is consistently high, and most stakeholders perceive it similarly—indicating a shared ethical culture across the educational institutions studied.

**Purpose and Use**
This visual serves as a concise analytical tool to:
-Summarize demographic factors influencing ethical leadership.
-Compare perceived vs. actual application of Buddhist principles.
-Highlight areas of alignment and discrepancy in leadership practice.

**Recommendation**
From the research results, the researchers have the following recommendations:
1. Policy recommendations
1.1 Relevant agencies should campaign for the application of the 4 Iddhipada principles in their agencies/departments/divisions to create a shared mind, create shared responsibility, and recognize the importance of using resources to achieve the greatest value.
1.2 The Office of the Primary Educational Service Area, Khon Kaen Area 1 should organize training for administrators to promote and develop methods of school administration according to the principles of the 4 Brahmaviharas.
1.3 The Office of the Primary Educational Service Area, Khon Kaen Area 1 should have continuous activities to promote administrative leadership for educational personnel.
2. Recommendations for implementation
2.1 The results of this study should be used as information for planning the administration of basic educational institutions to be of higher quality and efficiency.
2.2 The problematic approaches obtained from the study should be used to improve and solve the problematic areas. More clarity
3. Suggestions for future research
3.1 Should study the application of other Buddhist principles such as the Four Bases of Power, Kindness, Compassion, Mudita and Upekkha, etc., to the administration of basic education institutions.
3.2 Should study the sample groups from educational institutions with different structural characteristics to find differences.
3.3 Should study by increasing the number of independent variables to be more diverse.

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# A Study of Students' Attitudes toward the Teaching and Learning Management in the Political Science Program, Faculty of Social Sciences, Mahachulalongkornrajavidyalaya University, Nong Khai Campus[*]

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**Abstract**

This research aimed to 1) study the attitude level of students towards the teaching of Political Science, Faculty of Social Sciences, Mahachulalongkornrajavidyalaya University, Nong Khai Campus; 2) study the comparison of students' attitude towards the teaching of Political Science, Faculty of Social Sciences, Mahachulalongkornrajavidyalaya University, Nong Khai Campus; and 3) study the development approach for the teaching of Political Science, Faculty of Social Sciences, Mahachulalongkornrajavidyalaya University, Nong Khai Campus. The research was conducted using quantitative research. Data were collected using questionnaires with a sample group of undergraduate students in every year of the academic year 2017, totaling 180 students/persons. The statistics used for data analysis were frequency, percentage, mean, standard deviation, and hypothesis testing using t-test and f-test. When differences were found, the Scheffe method was used to test the differences of paired means.

The research results found that:

1. The students' attitudes towards the teaching of the Political Science program, Faculty of Social Sciences, Mahachulalongkornrajavidyalaya University, Nong Khai Campus, were at a high level overall.

2. The results of the t-test statistical test were not different overall, so the hypothesis was rejected. The results of the F-test statistical test were not different overall, so the hypothesis was rejected.

3. The recommendations for development guidelines for teaching the Political Science program require teachers to provide opportunities for students to express their opinions and participate in teaching at all times.

**Keywords**: Attitude of Students, Teaching and Learning in Political Science

**Introduction**

Mahachulalongkornrajavidyalaya University is a university of the Thai Sangha, established under the name Mahathat College by Phra Maha Paraminthara Maha Chulalongkorn, King Rama V of the Chakri Dynasty, as an institute of higher learning for the Sangha in 1887. It is located at Wat Mahathat Yuwaratrangsarit and was first opened on 8 September 1889. Later, King Chulalongkorn gave it a new name, Mahachulalongkornrajavidyalaya University, on 13 September 1896. He intended for it to be a place of study for Tripitaka and higher subjects for monks, novices, and laypeople. Later, Phra Phimontham (former name Choi Thanthat Mahathera) The abbot of Wat Mahathat Yuwaratrangsarit who continued the royal intention of King Rama V, organized a meeting of 57 senior monks of the Mahanikaya sect on January 9, 1947 and opened the first undergraduate Buddhist studies program on July 18, 1951 (Mahachulalongkornrajavidyalaya University, 1997: 1).

National Education Act B.E. 2542 (Amended No. 2) B.E. 2545 Chapter 1 General Objectives and Principles Section 6 The educational management must be for the development of Thai people to be complete human beings in body, mind, intellect, knowledge, morality, ethics and culture in living life, and able to live with others happily. Chapter 7 Teachers, lecturers and educational personnel Section 52 The Ministry shall promote the system of production and development of teachers, lecturers and educational personnel to have quality and standards appropriate for being a high-level profession by supervising and coordinating the institutions responsible for producing and developing teachers, lecturers and educational personnel to be ready and strong in preparing new personnel and continuously developing personnel. The state shall allocate a budget and establish a fund for the development of teachers, lecturers and educational personnel sufficiently.

Mahachulalongkornrajavidyalaya University Act, Chapter 1: Establishment, Objectives and Duties, Section 6: To be an educational and research institution with the objectives of providing education, research, promotion and academic services in Buddhism to monks, novices and laypeople, including the preservation of arts and culture. Chapter 5: Development of university personnel, Clause 34: To develop university personnel to be efficient in their work, the committee may determine the following personnel development activities: (1) Study and observation trips, (2) Research trips, (3) Academic service trips, (4) Academic knowledge enhancement trips, (5) Exchange of lecturers or academics, (6) Any other activities necessary or appropriate for the benefit of personnel development. (Mahachulalongkornrajavidyalaya University, 1997: 2)

By trying to manage teaching and learning with limited resources to be as efficient as possible, in order to be on par with both public and private universities, and to be accepted in the general circle, Mahachulalongkornrajavidyalaya University, Nong Khai Campus, must give importance to education management, especially in political science education, which is the core of governance and can be applied to govern the Sangha and various aspects for monks, novices, and target groups of people who come to use the services, creating a good impression, which is very important in the current information society, where monks, novices, and people have more choices in receiving education at various educational institutions, both public and private.

Therefore, knowing the attitudes of students, who are like important customers of the university and are the target group in the political science field of the university,

is essential to help the university know the strengths and weaknesses of teaching and learning in the political science field. Knowing the opinions of students, both monks and laymen, whether they have different opinions on teaching and learning, the university can organize teaching and learning in line with the needs of the students, which will make teaching and learning of the university more efficient.

**Objective**

1. To study the level of students' attitudes towards the teaching of Political Science, Faculty of Social Sciences, Mahachulalongkornrajavidyalaya University, Nong Khai Campus

2. To study and compare students' attitudes towards the teaching of Political Science, Faculty of Social Sciences, Mahachulalongkornrajavidyalaya University, Nong Khai Campus

3. To study the development guidelines for the teaching of Political Science, Faculty of Social Sciences, Mahachulalongkornrajavidyalaya University, Nong Khai Campus

**Literature review**

Understanding students' attitudes toward teaching and learning management is essential in enhancing the quality of education, especially in higher education institutions offering social science programs. Attitudes influence students' motivation, engagement, and academic success, and thus serve as indicators of the effectiveness of instructional strategies (Ajzen, 2001).

In the context of political science education, the learning environment must not only transmit theoretical knowledge but also encourage critical thinking, participatory discussion, and contextual analysis. According to Smith and Walker (2020), active learning approaches such as debates, simulations, and policy analysis significantly improve students' understanding and interest in political science. Furthermore, teaching strategies that integrate real-world applications tend to foster deeper engagement and positive attitudes among learners (Kuh et al., 2006).

The quality of teaching also significantly affects student perceptions. Effective teaching in political science requires not just expertise in the subject matter, but also the ability to facilitate open discussion, respect diverse opinions, and apply political theories to contemporary issues (Brookfield & Preskill, 2005). In a Thai context, Pongwat (2017) emphasizes that Buddhist universities such as Mahachulalongkornrajavidyalaya must balance traditional monastic values with modern pedagogical demands to maintain student interest and relevance in social science programs.

Moreover, students' attitudes are shaped by curriculum design, teacher-student interaction, assessment systems, and learning resources (Biggs & Tang, 2011). Programs that align course objectives with learner needs tend to receive more favorable attitudes. Chutima (2019) found that students in Thai public universities responded more positively to student-centered and flexible curriculum designs than to rigid lecture-based formats.

Cultural and institutional context also plays a role. At Mahachulalongkornrajavidyalaya University, where education is grounded in Buddhist philosophy, students may expect moral and ethical dimensions to be integrated with

political knowledge. According to Srisomphol and Sangkhamanee (2021), this hybrid expectation affects how students evaluate teaching effectiveness and relevance in political science education.

Therefore, investigating students' attitudes at the Nong Khai Campus provides a localized and culturally embedded perspective, potentially revealing unique needs and recommendations for instructional improvement. It aligns with calls for evidence-based enhancement of teaching strategies in Thai higher education (Office of the Higher Education Commission, 2018).

**Methodology**

The research on "A Study of Students' Attitudes toward the Teaching and Learning Management in the Political Science Program, Faculty of Social Sciences, Mahachulalongkornrajavidyalaya University, Nong Khai Campus" is a quantitative research, which is a survey research. The steps are as follows:

1. Study the theoretical concepts related to students' attitudes towards the management of political science teaching, Faculty of Social Sciences, Mahachulalongkornrajavidyalaya University, Nong Khai Campus from documents, textbooks, and related research.

2. Define the conceptual framework for the research and summarize it into a definition of research terms.

3. Create a questionnaire from the content framework in the definition of terms used in the research, dividing the questionnaire into 3 parts.

4. Present the completed questionnaire to experts for content validity check.

5. After the experts have checked it, it is tested with a measurement unit other than the research population and the reliability is calculated.

6. If the questionnaire is found to be reliable, it is tested with the target sample group.

Scope of the research The researcher has defined the scope of the research as follows:

1. Scope of content This research is a study Attitudes of students towards the teaching of Political Science, Faculty of Social Sciences, Mahachulalongkornrajavidyalaya University, Nong Khai Campus in various aspects, divided into 4 aspects: 1) Instructors 2) Teaching methods 3) Buildings and facilities 4) Teaching media

2. Scope of variables Independent variables include general characteristics of the population, including gender, status, age, education level, and occupation. Dependent variables include attitudes of students towards the teaching of Political Science, Faculty of Social Sciences, Mahachulalongkornrajavidyalaya University, Nong Khai Campus.

3. Scope of the population used in this research are undergraduate students of all years in the Political Science program, Faculty of Social Sciences, Mahachulalongkornrajavidyalaya University, Nong Khai Campus, in the academic year 2017, totaling 326 students/persons (Registrar and Evaluation Division, 2017). The sample group of this research is students of the Political Science program, Faculty of Social Sciences, Mahachulalongkornrajavidyalaya University. Nong Khai Campus in the academic year 2017, all undergraduate levels, 180 students/persons in all levels, by the sample size calculated from Taro Yamane's formula (Vanichbuncha, K.., 2005: 19)

Scope of research area The researcher conducted the study in the area of Mahachulalongkornrajavidyalaya University, Nong Khai Campus, Khai Bok Wan Subdistrict, Mueang District, Nong Khai Province.

Scope of research period from June 2017 to February 2018

Analysis of questionnaire data The statistics used to analyze the data are as follows: using statistics of number (Frequency) and percentage (Percentage) to explain the personal factors of the respondents. Analyze by presenting in a table to describe the results. Use statistics to analyze by finding the mean and standard deviation (S.D.) to explain the attitudes of students towards teaching the Department of Political Science, Faculty of Social Sciences, Mahachulalongkornrajavidyalaya University, Nong Khai Campus. Presented in the form of tables with captions and statistical tests to test hypotheses. The analysis of values was done by t-test, one-way analysis of variance (One way ANOVA) using F-test. When differences were found, the differences in paired means were tested using Scheffe's method.

**Results**

1. Attitudes of students towards the teaching of Political Science, Faculty of Social Sciences, Mahachulalongkornrajavidyalaya University, Nong Khai Campus It was found that the attitudes of students towards the teaching of Political Science, Faculty of Social Sciences, Mahachulalongkornrajavidyalaya University, Nong Khai Campus, were at a high level overall (mean = 4.07). When classified by each aspect, it was found that their attitudes towards the teaching were at a high level in all aspects. The results of the study were consistent with the research of Phramaha Theraphan Athipanyo (2011) who studied the research on "A Study of Desirable Characteristics of Monks Teaching Morality in Educational Institutions, Bangkok". The research results found that 1) The overall desirable characteristics of monks teaching morality in educational institutions, Bangkok, were at a high level. When considering each aspect, it was found that their opinions on the desirable characteristics of monks teaching morality in educational institutions were at a high level, ranked from the aspect with the highest average value to the lowest, namely, morality, dignity, and knowledge. 2) The results of the comparison of opinions of monks teaching morality in educational institutions, school administrators, and mentor teachers on the desirable characteristics of monks teaching morality in educational institutions Categorized by status, gender, age and education level, it was found that there were no different opinions in all 3 areas with statistical significance at the 0.05 level.

2. Comparison of student attitudes towards the teaching of Political Science, Faculty of Social Sciences, Mahachulalongkornrajavidyalaya University, Nong Khai Campus The results of the comparison of student attitudes towards the teaching of Political Science, Faculty of Social Sciences, Mahachulalongkornrajavidyalaya University, Nong Khai Campus found that students with different genders, ages, education levels, and occupations had different attitudes towards the teaching of Political Science, Faculty of Social Sciences, Mahachulalongkornrajavidyalaya University, Nong Khai Campus, overall, and were not different. Therefore, the hypothesis was rejected. The results of the study were consistent with the research of Attawong, P., (2010) who studied "Electronic Media Usage Behavior of Students of Mahachulalongkornrajavidyalaya University, Phrae Campus". The results of the study found that different types of students had different electronic media usage behaviors

overall and in each aspect, except for each item, which was significantly different at the .05 level. Different years of study had different electronic media usage behaviors overall, except for each item, which was significantly different at the .05 level. Different fields of study had different electronic media usage behaviors overall and in each aspect. There was no statistically significant difference at the .05 level. Age differences in electronic media usage behavior of students overall and in each aspect were not statistically significant different at the .05 level.

     3. Suggestions for development guidelines for teaching political science require teachers to provide opportunities for students to express their opinions and participate in teaching at all times.

**Discussion**

     **1. Students' Attitudes toward Teaching in Political Science**

     The study revealed that students' overall attitudes toward the teaching of Political Science at the Faculty of Social Sciences, Mahachulalongkornrajavidyalaya University, Nong Khai Campus, were at a **high level** (mean = 4.07). When analyzed by individual aspects—such as content delivery, instructor competence, classroom environment, and relevance to Buddhist values—students consistently reported high levels of satisfaction.

     These findings are consistent with the study conducted by **Phramaha Theraphan Athipanyo (2011)**, who examined the desirable characteristics of monks teaching morality in Bangkok's educational institutions. He found that learners perceived instructors positively across dimensions of **morality, dignity, and knowledge**, which aligns with the expectations held by students in a Buddhist-oriented political science program. This suggests that **educator qualities**—such as ethical conduct and subject mastery—are critical to student perceptions of teaching effectiveness in Buddhist universities.

     Similar high satisfaction levels have been reported in related studies where students evaluated instructors not only on academic capability but also on their ability to connect **ethical principles** to subject matter (Brookfield & Preskill, 2005; Pongwat, 2017). The high attitude scores may reflect the alignment between teaching content, instructional style, and the **institution's cultural-religious mission**.

     **2. Comparison of Student Attitudes by Demographic Factors**

     The study also examined whether student attitudes toward the teaching of political science differed significantly across gender, age, education level, and occupation. The results showed **no statistically significant differences** among these demographic variables, leading to a rejection of the research hypothesis. In other words, students generally shared similar positive attitudes toward the teaching of Political Science regardless of their backgrounds.

     This finding aligns with the research of **Attawong (2010)**, who investigated the behavior of students using electronic media at Mahachulalongkornrajavidyalaya University, Phrae Campus. He similarly found that **differences by age and gender** did not result in statistically significant variation in media usage, while only some variables

such as field of study or year level occasionally showed moderate differences. This consistency reinforces the notion that the **learning environment and institutional culture** play a more unifying role than demographic differences in shaping student attitudes.

Moreover, educational literature suggests that when curriculum design, teacher-student relationships, and institutional values are clear and consistently implemented, student perceptions tend to converge regardless of demographic distinctions (Biggs & Tang, 2011; Kuh et al., 2006).

**3. Recommendations for Teaching Development**

Based on the findings, it is recommended that political science instructors **actively involve students** in the teaching and learning process. This includes promoting open discussion, encouraging expression of diverse viewpoints, and incorporating participatory learning techniques. These approaches are not only consistent with modern educational theory (Smith & Walker, 2020), but also align well with the **dialogical traditions** of Buddhist pedagogy that value critical reflection and community engagement (Srisomphol & Sangkhamanee, 2021).

Therefore, for continuous improvement in teaching political science at Mahachulalongkornrajavidyalaya University, instructors should blend **interactive pedagogy** with **moral leadership**, fostering a learning environment that supports both academic and ethical development.

**New knowledge**



**Suggestions for Improvement**

Teachers should promote student participation for better engagement.

**Overall Attitudes**

Students show high agreement with positive teaching statements.

**Demographic Factors**

Demographic factors do not significantly influence student attitudes.

**Figure 1** New knowledge, 2024

The image presents a **summary infographic** using a **plant-like graphic** with three curved branches, each containing a key finding from a study on students' attitudes toward teaching in Political Science.

**1. Suggestions for Improvement** (top left, green):
- o Icon: A checklist or form.
- o Text: *"Teachers should promote student participation for better engagement."*
- o Interpretation: Recommends more interactive and student-centered teaching methods.

**2. Overall Attitudes** (middle left, light green):
- o Icon: Three people representing a group or class.
- o Text: *"Students show high agreement with positive teaching statements."*
- o Interpretation: Indicates that students generally have favorable attitudes toward current teaching practices.

**3. Demographic Factors** (right side, blue):
- o Icon: Two overlapping user icons.
- o Text: *"Demographic factors do not significantly influence student attitudes."*
- o Interpretation: Confirms that variables like gender, age, or occupation did not result in statistically significant differences in student perceptions.

The design effectively visualizes key points in a clean, simple, and engaging format using color coding and minimalist icons to distinguish each theme.

**Recommendation**

**1. Policy recommendations**

1.1 We want teachers to provide opportunities for students to express their opinions and participate in teaching and learning at all times.

1.2 In terms of teaching methods, we want teachers to provide advice and guidance to students in a friendly manner more than others.

1.3 We want the department to provide enough classrooms for students, with materials and equipment ready for use, and an atmosphere conducive to teaching and learning.

1.4 We want the department to provide learning resources, such as a computer room and books, to provide sufficient services to students.

**2. Practical recommendations**

2.1 Teachers should provide opportunities for students to express their opinions and participate in teaching and learning at all times.

2.2 Teachers should provide advice and guidance to students in a friendly manner, and clearly publicize news about teaching and learning management.

2.3 The department should provide enough classrooms for students, with materials and equipment ready for use, and an atmosphere conducive to teaching and learning at all times.

2.4 The department should provide learning resources, such as a computer room and books. To provide adequate services to students

### 3. Suggestions for future research

3.1 The study should be conducted using the principles of good governance in the administration of the organization or branch because it will make the teaching of the Political Science Program, Faculty of Social Sciences, Mahachulalongkornrajavidyalaya University, Nong Khai Campus, Nong Khai Province more efficient.

3.2 In order to be consistent with the development of the organization, there should be a study of the needs, problems and conditions of teaching and learning management with the lecturers of each branch within Mahachulalongkornrajavidyalaya University, Nong Khai Campus.

3.3 A study should be conducted on the application of other Buddhist principles such as the 4 Sangkhawatthu, 6 Saraniyadhamma, 4 biases, etc., together with the duties of personnel within Mahachulalongkornrajavidyalaya University, Nong Khai Campus.

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# Political Identity and Social Change in Contemporary Thai Society[*]

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## Abstract

This article examines the intersection of political identity and social change in contemporary Thai society, focusing on how regional, generational, and ideological identities have emerged as catalysts for democratic reform. It explores the historical foundations of identity formation, the rise of regional consciousness in Isaan, generational conflicts over monarchy and national narratives, and the development of progressive political movements. Despite growing public mobilization, efforts at transformation are constrained by entrenched elite structures—namely, military coups, judicial interventions, and monarchical dominance. The article concludes by identifying potential pathways for inclusive reform, including inter-regional alliances, youth engagement, and legal restructuring. This study contributes to a deeper understanding of identity politics in semi-authoritarian contexts and highlights the transformative potential of collective political agency in Thailand.

**Keywords**: Political Identity, Social Change, Democratization, Monarchy Reform, Thailand

## Introduction

Political identity in the Thai context refers to the self-conception and group affiliation of individuals or communities based on shared political beliefs, regional loyalties, historical experiences, social status, or ideological orientations. It encompasses allegiances to specific political ideologies, parties, or movements, and is often shaped by deeper socio-cultural undercurrents such as ethnicity, religion, and class structure (Connors, 2007). Meanwhile, **social change** in Thailand includes the transformation of societal values, political institutions, and power relations, driven by such factors as democratization efforts, economic development, and citizen mobilization (McCargo, 2005). In Thailand, political identity and social change are intricately interwoven, with identity-based movements playing a central role in demanding or resisting structural reforms.

Thailand has undergone repeated cycles of democratization and authoritarian regression since the end of the absolute monarchy in 1932. The *People's Party Revolution* in that year introduced a constitutional framework, but military coups and autocratic governance have remained recurrent features of Thai political life. These fluctuations have continually reshaped political identities—especially along lines of region (e.g., the rise of Isaan regional consciousness), generation (e.g., the youth-led protests of 2020–2021), and ideology (e.g., the liberal-progressive agendas of parties like Future Forward and Move Forward) (Dressel & Khemthong, 2024; ISEAS, 2024). Thailand's political development, therefore, cannot be understood without addressing how these identities are formed, mobilized, and challenged over time.

This article investigates the dynamic interplay between **political identity and social change** in Thailand's contemporary setting. It seeks to answer two central research questions:

1. How do political identities—regional, class-based, generational, and ideological—evolve in Thailand's shifting political landscape?

2. What impact do these evolving identities have on broader processes of social change, such as democratization, legal reform, or civic participation?

By engaging with these questions, the study contributes to understanding how identity politics fuels both progressive mobilization and reactionary backlash within Thai society, especially under an unstable democratic framework. The article draws on historical analysis, case studies of political movements, and recent protest waves to contextualize the reconfiguration of Thai political identities and their transformative potential.

**Historical Foundations**
**1. Nation-Building and Thaification**
Thailand's project of nation-building in the 20th century was deeply shaped by the state's effort to cultivate a cohesive national identity, known as "Thainess" (khwampenthai). This project was largely pursued through "Thaification" (การทำให้เป็นไทย), a series of cultural and political strategies implemented particularly during the reign of Field Marshal Phibun Songkhram (1938–1944 and 1948–1957). Thaification policies aimed to assimilate or suppress the diverse ethnic and cultural identities within the country—including Isaan Lao communities, Malay Muslims in the South, ethnic Chinese, and hill tribes in the North—in favor of a centrally-defined Thai Buddhist identity (Winichakul, 1994; Jory, 2000).

These policies included mandatory use of the Thai language, Thai-script signage, centralized education curricula, state-led rituals, and legal prohibitions on non-Thai languages in official settings. For instance, in the Isaan region, which shares strong cultural ties with Laos, speaking Lao dialects in school was discouraged or punished, and local traditions were often labeled as backward (McCargo & Hongladarom, 2004). Ethnic Chinese were pressured to adopt Thai surnames and

integrate into Thai society, especially during Cold War-era fears of communist infiltration (library.fes.de). These assimilationist policies not only marginalized ethnic identities but also laid the foundation for region-based political grievances that persist today.

Such strategies reflect the broader ideological goal of creating a unified Thai nation-state capable of resisting colonial encroachment and internal dissent. However, the legacy of Thaification is a double-edged sword: while it helped consolidate the Thai state, it also entrenched ethnic and regional divisions, fueling future identity-based mobilizations.

### 2. Student and Peasant Movements of the 1970s

The 1970s marked a pivotal era in the formation of modern political identity in Thailand, driven by grassroots mobilizations, especially among students and peasants. The 1973 student uprising, culminating in the October 14th incident, was a landmark moment that ended the military dictatorship of Thanom Kittikachorn and ushered in a brief democratic period. The uprising was led primarily by middle-class university students from institutions like Thammasat University and Chulalongkorn University, who challenged authoritarianism and demanded constitutional reform, press freedom, and democratic participation (Wikipedia, 2023).

Simultaneously, peasant movements—especially in the Northeast—organized around issues such as land reform, unfair tenancy, and exploitative landlords. The Farmers Federation of Thailand (FFT), established in the early 1970s, became a platform for rural mobilization. The FFT organized thousands of farmers to demand land rights and lower land rents, often facing threats, assassination, and violent suppression. These movements represented a clear shift in political identity among rural populations, who began to view themselves not just as subjects of the state, but as rights-bearing citizens with collective interests (Morell & Samudavanija, 1981).

Together, the student and peasant movements highlighted class-based grievances and laid the groundwork for later regional and ideological mobilizations, such as the Red Shirt movement in the 2000s. These events also forged a culture of resistance that continues to shape the political consciousness of younger generations and rural constituencies alike.

### Regional Identity and Political Mobilization

#### 1. The Rise of Isaan Identity

In recent decades, Isaan, the northeastern region of Thailand, has undergone a remarkable transformation in regional political identity. Historically marginalized through state-led Thaification policies and excluded from the economic development concentrated in Bangkok and the Central Plains, Isaan communities have developed a strong sense of regional consciousness, rooted in their Lao-influenced culture, dialect (Phasa Lao), and shared experience of socio-economic exclusion (McCargo & Hongladarom, 2004).

While once viewed as peripheral, Isaan has emerged as a politically significant bloc, particularly during the rise of Thaksin Shinawatra in the early 2000s. Thaksin's populist policies—such as universal healthcare and village funds—resonated deeply with the rural poor, especially in Isaan. As a result, the region became a key support base for the Red Shirt movement (United Front for Democracy Against Dictatorship - UDD), which mobilized millions of rural and working-class citizens in defense of electoral democracy and against military-backed elites (TIME, 2014; Wikipedia, 2023a).

The assertion of Isaan identity through political mobilization represents a significant break from the past. Where once Isaan was seen as politically dormant or easily co-opted, it now serves as a symbol of rural empowerment, democratic legitimacy, and resistance to Bangkok-centric elitism. The Red Shirt protests of 2010–2014, though violently suppressed, cemented Isaan's role in shaping the national political discourse.

### 2. Red Shirts vs. Yellow Shirts

Thailand's political conflicts in the 21st century have been deeply shaped by the dichotomy between the Red Shirts and Yellow Shirts, whose contrasting political identities reflect broader class and regional divides.

The Red Shirts, aligned with Thaksin Shinawatra and subsequent parties such as Pheu Thai, emerged as a populist movement rooted in rural regions (especially Isaan and the North), the urban working class, and those demanding electoral representation. They framed their struggle as a fight for democratic legitimacy, opposing the repeated nullification of elections by military coups and judicial interventions (Pye & Schaffar, 2008).

In contrast, the Yellow Shirts, organized under the People's Alliance for Democracy (PAD), represented Bangkok's middle class, royalists, military elites, and sections of the urban intelligentsia. They accused Thaksin and his allies of corruption and populist authoritarianism, often invoking loyalty to the monarchy and traditional values to justify their actions. The Yellow Shirts supported unelected bodies and judicial interventions as safeguards against what they saw as the "tyranny of the majority" (ResearchGate, 2013; Wikipedia, 2023b).

This Red–Yellow conflict is not merely political—it reveals the deep socio-economic and cultural polarization in Thai society:

- Urban vs. rural
- Central vs. regional (especially Isaan)
- Elitist technocracy vs. mass electoral populism

The antagonism between these movements set the stage for political instability, repeated military coups (e.g., 2006, 2014), and the erosion of democratic institutions. Yet, it also shows how political identity rooted in region, class, and ideology has become a driving force for civic engagement and contestation in Thailand.

**Urban Youth and Generational Shifts**

    **1. Student-led Pro-democracy Protests (2020–21)**

    One of the most profound political developments in contemporary Thai society has been the youth-led pro-democracy protests of 2020–2021, spearheaded primarily by high school and university students. Sparked by the dissolution of the Future Forward Party in February 2020, and later intensified by the COVID-19 economic fallout and perceived government incompetence, these protests evolved into a mass movement demanding systemic change—not only in governance but in the role of the monarchy. Young protesters, many of whom were born after the 2006 and 2014 coups, organized under decentralized networks such as the Free Youth Movement and United Front of Thammasat and Demonstration. They publicly called for the resignation of Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha, the drafting of a new constitution, and—most provocatively—reform of the monarchy under Section 112 (Thailand's lèse-majesté law) (Wikipedia, 2023).

    What distinguished this movement was not only its radical demands but also its use of digital media, satire, and cultural references. Youth protestors appropriated memes, anime, and pop-culture symbols (such as *Harry Potter*, *The Hunger Games*, and K-pop fan culture) to critique authoritarianism and elite privilege. Flash mobs, online forums like Twitter (#ยกเลิก112), and encrypted messaging platforms became tools for mobilization, while protest art, music, and cosplay events created a new language of dissent (Numnonda, 2022).

    This cultural rupture represented a break from earlier, more deferential protest traditions. It also marked a shift from political expression based on regional or class identity toward one anchored in generational experience, digital fluency, and demands for institutional accountability.

    **2. Generational Contestation Over National Narratives**

    The youth-led protests also ignited a broader generational conflict over national identity and historical memory. Traditional Thai state narratives, long shaped by royalist-nationalist historiography, portray the monarchy as the cornerstone of national unity, and the military as its guardian. These views are widely disseminated through textbooks, education, and state media.

    However, younger Thais are increasingly challenging these narratives, questioning the sanctity of the monarchy, the legitimacy of repeated military coups, and the erasure of dissenting voices in Thai history. Online campaigns have demanded revisions to school curricula that glorify kings and generals while omitting events such as the 1976 Thammasat University massacre or the role of the monarchy in political interventions.

    This intergenerational rift is more than symbolic—it is political. While older generations (especially those shaped by Cold War-era propaganda) often prioritize stability and hierarchical order, younger cohorts call for transparency, decentralization, and civic empowerment (Aim Sinpeng, 2021). Their activism reflects a redefinition of

Thainess, where identity is no longer tied to obedience and loyalty, but to democratic participation and human rights.

Thus, the political identity of Thailand's urban youth is both a rejection of authoritarian traditions and a vision of a new social contract, grounded in pluralism, equality, and critical engagement with the past.

## Ideological and Political Organizations

### 1. Emergence of Ideological Cleavages

Contemporary Thai politics is increasingly shaped by deep ideological polarization that transcends traditional divisions of class and region. These ideological cleavages reflect competing visions of Thailand's political future, particularly along the lines of populism vs. neoliberalism, and monarchical absolutism vs. constitutional reform.

On one end of the spectrum, populist movements, exemplified by Thaksin Shinawatra's Thai Rak Thai and its successors, have emphasized redistributive policies, rural development, and inclusive welfare. These policies garnered mass support from rural constituencies and urban working-class populations, especially in Isaan and the North (Hewison, 2010).

On the other hand, neoliberal technocratic elites—often aligned with military regimes or judiciary-backed governments—have promoted austerity, centralization, and stability over redistributive justice. These groups typically claim moral authority to "protect" the monarchy and national order, justifying their actions through anti-corruption discourse and nationalism (Connors, 2021).

The most contentious ideological divide, however, centers on the role of the monarchy in Thailand's political system. While conservative forces treat the monarchy as an inviolable institution above politics, reformist factions—especially among youth and progressive parties—have openly called for constitutional reform and accountability, challenging the long-standing taboo surrounding royal critique (TIME, 2020; Wikipedia, 2023a). This contestation has become the ideological fault line driving protest movements and reshaping electoral politics.

### 2. Progressive Parties and Social Democracy

The past decade has seen the emergence of progressive parties that explicitly campaign on platforms of social democracy, decentralization, civil rights, and military reform. Central to this evolution has been the trajectory from Future Forward Party (FFP) to the Move Forward Party (MFP) and the Progressive Movement.

- Future Forward Party, founded in 2018 by Thanathorn Juangroongruangkit and Piyabutr Saengkanokkul, captured the imagination of young voters with its critique of military dominance, advocacy for judicial and bureaucratic reform, and bold stance on reducing military budgets and decentralizing power. Despite winning over 6.2 million votes in the 2019 election, the party was controversially dissolved by the Constitutional

Court in early 2020, which many viewed as politically motivated suppression (Wikipedia, 2023b).

- Following FFP's dissolution, its successor, the Move Forward Party (MFP), assumed its parliamentary role and maintained its progressive agenda. MFP notably supported monarchy reform by proposing amendments to the lèse-majesté law (Section 112), and championed labor rights, environmental regulation, and transparent governance (gala.gre.ac.uk; TIME, 2023).

- Outside parliament, former FFP leaders launched the Progressive Movement, a social and political advocacy group that continues to mobilize local activists, contest local elections, and promote democratic education and constitutional reform.

Together, these entities embody a new progressive political identity in Thailand—one that is urban, youth-driven, reformist, and grounded in democratic socialism. Their rise signals not only a generational shift but also a growing demand for structural transformation beyond electoral politics.

**Intersection of Identity & Social Transformation**

The convergence of regional, generational, and ideological identities in contemporary Thailand has become a powerful catalyst for social transformation, particularly in demands for constitutional rewriting, decentralization of power, reform of the monarchy, and reduction of inequality.

### 1.Constitutional Rewriting

One of the most prominent demands arising from identity-based political mobilization is the call for a new democratic constitution. The current 2017 Constitution—drafted under military rule—has been widely criticized for entrenching military power, enabling unelected Senate control, and suppressing popular representation. Regional and generational identities intersect here: rural Red Shirt-aligned regions (e.g., Isaan) demand electoral justice, while urban youth advocate for structural reforms that reflect pluralism and accountability (Wikipedia, 2023a).

Young Thais, particularly those engaged in the 2020–2021 protests, have framed the constitution as a symbol of authoritarian legacy, and constitutional reform as essential for democratization. This reflects a generational political identity grounded in participatory rights, equality before the law, and freedom of expression.

### 2. Decentralization of Power

Regional political identity, especially in Isaan and the Deep South, has long clashed with Bangkok-centric governance. Centralized control over budgets, education, and administration has contributed to economic disparity and cultural alienation. Demands for decentralization—including elected provincial governors, local budgetary autonomy, and linguistic rights—are grounded in a belief that political agency must be redistributed from the elite capital to the periphery (McCargo & Hongladarom, 2004).

Decentralization also overlaps with ideological demands for democratic reform. Progressive parties and civil society organizations have pushed for empowered local governance as a path to both efficiency and justice.

### 3. Monarchy Reform

One of the most controversial and transformative intersections of identity and political demand is the call for monarchy reform. This is driven primarily by a new generation of activists who question the absolute reverence traditionally accorded to the monarchy and seek constitutional limits on royal power. The protests of 2020–2021 broke longstanding taboos by issuing 10-point reform proposals, including fiscal transparency of royal assets, abolition of lèse-majesté laws (Section 112), and ensuring the monarchy remains under the constitution (Wikipedia, 2023b).

These demands are rooted in an ideological identity that champions equality, republicanism, and open political discourse—challenging the symbolic and legal architecture of hierarchical Thai society.

### 4. Inequality Reduction

Finally, identity politics in Thailand has been a driver of demands to reduce economic and social inequality, which remains among the highest in Asia. Populist identity (e.g., Red Shirt support for Thaksin) foregrounds welfare and redistribution, while progressive identity advocates for systemic change—from land reform to labor rights to taxing wealth.

The convergence of class-based, regional, and generational concerns has transformed inequality from a technical policy issue into a core political demand. These identities frame inequality not just as economic disparity but as a structural injustice tied to authoritarianism, privilege, and exclusion.

## Challenges and Prospects

### Structural Constraints on Identity-Based Reform

Despite growing momentum behind identity-based movements—whether regional, generational, or ideological—Thailand's sociopolitical transformation faces formidable structural obstacles. Three primary institutional mechanisms have historically undermined progressive reform efforts: military coups, judicial interventions, and monarchical dominance.

### 1. Military Coups

Thailand has experienced over a dozen coups since 1932. These military takeovers have consistently disrupted democratic progress, dissolved elected governments, and imposed authoritarian constitutions that entrench elite rule. The 2006 and 2014 coups—targeting Thaksin-aligned parties and progressive coalitions—demonstrated how the military functions as a guardian of the status quo, resisting redistributive or democratic reforms often associated with marginalized political identities (Connors, 2021).

**2. Judicial Interventions**

The Constitutional Court and other judicial bodies have frequently been used to dismantle opposition parties and suppress reformist agendas. The dissolution of the Future Forward Party in 2020 is a prominent example. Critics argue that Thailand's judiciary lacks independence and acts in concert with conservative elites to neutralize electoral threats, thereby undermining the legitimacy of identity-driven democratic movements (Sinpeng, 2021).

**3. Monarchical Dominance**

Although constitutionally symbolic, the Thai monarchy wields extra-constitutional influence through its cultural sanctity, economic assets (e.g., Crown Property Bureau), and informal ties to the military and judiciary. This has created a monarcho-military alliance that resists any attempt at institutional accountability. The criminalization of critique through lèse-majesté laws (Section 112) has further curtailed free speech and reformist discourse, particularly among youth and progressives (Taylor & Francis Online, 2022).

These interlocking constraints form a resilient elite governance structure that limits the scope of institutional change, despite widespread public mobilization.

**Prospects and Avenues for Depolarization**

While the structural constraints are significant, several avenues for democratic renewal and depolarization remain open:

**1. Inter-Regional Alliances**

Building coalitions across traditionally polarized regions—such as between Isaan rural voters and urban youth activists—can challenge Bangkok-centric narratives and create a broader democratic front. Shared grievances over inequality, exclusion, and state violence offer common ground for collective action.

**2. Youth Engagement and Political Education**

The rise of politically engaged youth signals long-term potential for transformation. Schools, universities, and civic groups can serve as platforms for critical citizenship education, fostering cross-generational dialogue and promoting political literacy beyond partisanship.

**3. Legal and Constitutional Reform**

Incremental legal changes—such as amending Section 112, strengthening judicial independence, or implementing local governance reforms—can institutionalize space for diverse political identities. Though currently obstructed, sustained public pressure and international advocacy may help reopen reform windows in the future (Taylor & Francis Online, 2023).

These pathways do not offer immediate solutions, but they present strategic entry points for reshaping Thailand's political landscape toward inclusivity and justice.

**Conclusion**

The transformation of political identity in contemporary Thai society—across regional, generational, and ideological lines—has become central to understanding the country's evolving political and social dynamics. From the rise of **Isaan regionalism** and rural populism, to the **emergence of youth-led demands for monarchy reform**, to the consolidation of **progressive political forces** like the Move Forward Party, Thailand's identity landscape is increasingly pluralistic, assertive, and politically engaged.

These identities have fueled powerful **calls for structural change**, including demands for constitutional rewriting, decentralization, monarchy reform, and socioeconomic equity. While such mobilizations represent democratic vitality, they have also provoked entrenched resistance from Thailand's **traditional power centers**, particularly the military, judiciary, and monarchy. These institutions act as gatekeepers of the existing order, using both legal mechanisms and ideological narratives to contain transformative pressures.

Nonetheless, the enduring political participation of youth, the assertiveness of marginalized regions, and the ideological maturation of reformist movements suggest that **Thailand is at an inflection point**. The path forward will likely involve ongoing contestation—but also potential for **constructive renegotiation of the social contract**, provided that space for dialogue, coalition-building, and legal reform can be preserved or expanded.

In sum, political identity in Thailand is no longer a passive reflection of state-imposed narratives. It is a **contested and evolving force**, actively shaping and being shaped by movements for democracy, justice, and inclusion. Recognizing and engaging these identities as legitimate political actors will be essential to achieving lasting and equitable social transformation.

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# Social Inequality and Political Participation of Thai Citizens[*]

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**Abstract**

This article examines the intricate relationship between social inequality and political participation in Thailand. It explores how disparities in income, education, and regional development shape access to political processes, both electoral and non-electoral. Drawing on empirical data and case studies, the study highlights how marginalized communities face systemic barriers to engagement due to patronage politics, limited civic education, and legal repression. The article concludes with policy recommendations to promote inclusive participation through civic education reform, electoral restructuring, and legal protections for civil society.

**Keywords**: Social inequality, Political participation, Thailand, Civic engagement, Democracy

## Introduction

Political participation is a fundamental component of democratic societies, encompassing a range of activities such as voting, protesting, petitioning, and engaging in political discussions or civic organizations (Verba, Schlozman, & Brady, 1995). Through participation, citizens exercise their political rights, hold governments accountable, and shape public policy. The health of a democracy is often gauged by the extent and inclusiveness of political engagement among its citizens (Dahl, 1989).

However, in many countries—including Thailand—political participation is marked by significant disparities. Unequal political engagement among Thai citizens is particularly evident along lines of socioeconomic status, education, gender, and geographic location (Laothamatas, 1996; McCargo, 2019). While some groups actively engage in political processes, others remain marginalized or disengaged, often due to structural, institutional, or cultural barriers. For example, rural populations and the urban poor may face limited access to political information or be disillusioned by elite-dominated politics (Walker, 2012).

This study addresses the critical issue of political inequality in Thailand by investigating the factors that influence varying levels of citizen participation. Understanding this gap is vital for strengthening democratic institutions and fostering inclusive governance. As Thailand has experienced cycles of democratic openings and authoritarian reversals, the dynamics of political participation offer key insights into the country's ongoing struggle for democratization and political reform (Hewison, 2014; Chambers & Waitoolkiat, 2016). By examining these patterns, this research contributes to the broader discourse on democratic development and the conditions necessary for effective political inclusion in transitional societies.

**The Landscape of Social Inequality in Thailand**

Thailand presents a compelling case of persistent and multifaceted social inequality, which significantly shapes the contours of political participation and democratic development. These inequalities—economic, educational, regional, and ethnic—create structural barriers that inhibit inclusive civic engagement.

**1. Economic Disparities**

Thailand is characterized by stark income inequality and class-based exclusion. Despite notable economic growth over the past decades, wealth distribution remains highly skewed. According to the Credit Suisse Global Wealth Report (2018), Thailand had one of the highest wealth inequality rates in the world, with the richest 1% holding over 66.9% of the country's wealth. This economic disparity manifests in unequal access to political influence, as wealthier individuals can afford greater political engagement through campaign financing, lobbying, or elite networks (Phongpaichit & Baker, 2004).

Moreover, the dominance of informal labor—accounting for over 55% of the workforce—contributes to economic insecurity and political disenfranchisement (ILO, 2021). Informal workers often lack social protections, union representation, and access to political platforms, which hinders their ability to mobilize for collective interests. This structural economic exclusion limits their participation in formal political processes and policymaking.

**2. Educational Gaps**

Another critical factor is the persistent gap in educational attainment, which directly affects civic literacy and political efficacy. Education is a key determinant of political participation, as it equips individuals with the knowledge and skills to navigate complex political systems (Nie, Junn, & Stehlik-Barry, 1996). In Thailand, however, disparities in educational quality and access are pronounced between urban and rural areas. Schools in the Northeast and Deep South often face shortages of qualified teachers, instructional materials, and infrastructure (UNESCO, 2015).

These disparities have led to a widespread deficiency in civic education. As a result, many citizens—particularly in rural areas—lack access to accurate political information or the ability to critically evaluate political narratives. This reinforces voter manipulation, patron-client relationships, and political apathy among disadvantaged groups (Laothamatas, 1996).

### 3. Regional and Ethnic Dimensions

Regional inequality is also a defining feature of Thailand's political landscape. The Northeast (Isan) and Southern border provinces have long been politically marginalized, both in terms of representation and resource allocation. Historically, Isan has been treated as a peripheral region by the Bangkok-based political establishment, despite being a populous and politically active area (Walker, 2012). The centralized nature of Thai governance has excluded many Isan voices from national policymaking, fueling resentment and identity-based mobilization, such as the Red Shirt movement.

Ethnic and indigenous minority groups—including the Malay Muslims in the South and hill tribes in the North—face systematic exclusion from state institutions and legal protections (Chambers, 2013). These communities often lack formal citizenship documentation, land rights, and representation in parliament, further limiting their political agency and deepening social inequality.

## Patterns of Political Participation

Thailand's political participation is characterized by contrasting dynamics of high voter turnout and periodic mass mobilizations, alongside institutional constraints and coercive laws that inhibit broader engagement. The nature and quality of participation differ significantly across demographic, economic, and geographic lines, shaped by both enabling and restrictive structures.

### 1. Electoral Participation

Thailand has generally exhibited high levels of voter turnout in national elections. However, disaggregation by region, income, and education reveals notable disparities. Voter turnout in the North and Northeast—regions historically marginalized—has been consistently high, often surpassing Bangkok and Southern provinces (Election Commission of Thailand, 2019). This is partly attributed to the political mobilization efforts of populist parties such as Thai Rak Thai and Pheu Thai, which resonated with rural voters through welfare-oriented platforms (Walker, 2012).

Socioeconomic status also plays a critical role. Lower-income and less-educated voters participate in elections at high rates, but their choices are frequently shaped by patron-client networks and vote-buying mechanisms. Political scientists have noted that vote buying remains prevalent in rural constituencies, where financial inducements are normalized as part of reciprocal obligations (Callahan, 2000). While often seen as undermining democratic ideals, others argue that these exchanges reflect localized forms of political engagement rooted in everyday survival and political brokerage (Pasuk & Baker, 2009).

### 2. Non-Electoral Engagement

Beyond the ballot box, non-electoral participation in Thailand has been dynamic but also polarized. Protest movements, such as the **Red Shirts** (United Front for Democracy Against Dictatorship, UDD), emerged in response to elite

domination and military interventions, demanding electoral justice and inclusive democracy. Conversely, movements like the **Yellow Shirts** and **People's Democratic Reform Committee (PDRC)** reflected middle-class disillusionment with populist rule, advocating for political reform often through undemocratic means (McCargo & Ukrist, 2005; Montesano et al., 2012).

More recently, student-led movements during 2020–21 introduced new forms of dissent, including symbolic protests and demands for monarchy reform. These youth-led actions marked a generational shift in political consciousness, utilizing digital platforms like Twitter and TikTok to circumvent state-controlled narratives (Sinpeng, 2021). However, the **digital divide** persists, with rural populations and older citizens less able to access or leverage online spaces for political engagement (UNDP, 2021).

Thailand's legal environment remains repressive, limiting non-electoral participation. Laws such as **Article 112** (lèse majesté), protest bans under emergency decrees, and sedition charges have been used to suppress dissent and silence activists. These legal tools not only chill public discourse but systematically disempower critical voices, especially among youth, journalists, and minority groups (Human Rights Watch, 2022).

## 3. Institutional and Structural Barriers

Institutional obstacles further restrict meaningful political participation. **Gerrymandering** and electoral engineering—especially under the 2017 Constitution—have diluted opposition representation by favoring small parties and pro-military coalitions (Chambers & Waitoolkiat, 2020). The **military's entrenched influence**, via reserved Senate appointments and constitutional veto points, skews the democratic process.

Judicial interventions have also played a decisive role in shaping electoral outcomes. Courts have disbanded multiple reformist and opposition parties, including Thai Raksa Chart in 2019 and Future Forward in 2020, undermining the representational integrity of the electoral system (Dressel & Khemthong, 2020). These actions reflect an enduring pattern of **judicialization of politics**, where courts act as political arbiters rather than neutral institutions. Furthermore, **access to decision-making remains elite-dominated**. Despite decentralization efforts, local governance often lacks genuine autonomy, with central agencies retaining fiscal and legal control. Marginalized communities, including ethnic minorities and the urban poor, are systematically excluded from policy-making forums and legislative representation (UNDP, 2021).

**Policy Recommendations**

Addressing the intertwined challenges of social inequality and political exclusion in Thailand requires a multifaceted approach that enhances citizen agency, democratizes institutional structures, and protects political freedoms. The following policy recommendations aim to promote inclusive political participation and support democratic deepening.

### 1. Civic Education Reforms Targeting Underprivileged Communities

One of the foundational strategies for enhancing political participation is the reform of civic education to prioritize inclusivity and critical engagement. Current curricula often emphasize passive obedience and nationalistic values rather than active citizenship (UNESCO, 2015). A reoriented civic education model—especially tailored for underprivileged communities in the Northeast, Deep South, and ethnic minority regions—should include modules on democratic rights, critical media consumption, and mechanisms of political accountability.

Programs modeled on participatory education frameworks can empower marginalized youth and adults to better understand political processes, thus enabling informed and sustained engagement (Kerr, 1999). Such reforms would also help counter clientelistic practices by promoting political efficacy and issue-based voting.

### 2. Electoral System Redesign for Proportionality and Access

Thailand's mixed electoral system has been criticized for fragmenting opposition forces and favoring entrenched elites, especially under the 2017 Constitution which weakened party-list proportionality (Chambers & Waitoolkiat, 2020). A redesign of the electoral framework to enhance proportionality—such as increasing the weight of party-list seats—could ensure fairer representation of minority and reformist voices.

Moreover, improving accessibility for underrepresented populations through mobile polling units, multilingual ballots for ethnic minorities, and easier voter registration processes would mitigate barriers faced by rural, disabled, and undocumented citizens (UNDP, 2021).

### 3. Investment in Media Literacy and Regional Infrastructure

Political participation is deeply shaped by the ability to access and assess information. Bridging the digital divide—which marginalizes rural and poor communities from online political discourse—requires public investment in broadband infrastructure and digital tools, especially in provinces outside Bangkok and tourist hubs (Sinpeng, 2021).

Complementing infrastructure development, media literacy initiatives are essential to help citizens navigate disinformation, partisan news, and propaganda. Integrating media analysis skills into school curricula and community training programs would foster more resilient and informed democratic engagement (Wardle & Derakhshan, 2017).

### 4. Strengthening Civil Society and Legal Protections for Participation

An enabling environment for civil society is critical to fostering participation beyond electoral cycles. The Thai state should revise restrictive laws such as the Public Assembly Act and narrow interpretations of Article 112 (lèse majesté) that are often used to suppress dissent and criminalize peaceful activism (Human Rights Watch, 2022).

Furthermore, policies that support grassroots organizations—including funding, legal status recognition, and capacity-building—are vital to amplify the voices of marginalized groups and sustain political mobilization. Building alliances between NGOs, student movements, and local advocacy groups can counterbalance state power and create more participatory public spheres (Carothers & Brechenmacher, 2014).

**Conclusion**

Thailand's democratic development continues to be constrained by deeply rooted social inequalities that manifest across economic, educational, regional, and institutional dimensions. These disparities significantly shape patterns of political participation, privileging some citizens while marginalizing others. Although electoral participation in Thailand remains relatively high, it is often mediated by clientelistic structures and unequal access to political information and institutions. Non-electoral engagement, including protest and digital activism, has surged in recent years—particularly among youth—but faces growing repression through restrictive laws and authoritarian interventions.

Institutional arrangements such as gerrymandering, judicial partisanship, and military dominance further compound these challenges by systematically excluding reformist and marginalized voices. The result is a fragmented and uneven democratic space where participation is both stratified and contested.

Addressing these issues requires comprehensive reforms aimed at reducing structural barriers and fostering inclusive civic engagement. Key policy recommendations include targeted civic education for underserved communities, redesigning the electoral system for proportional representation, expanding regional infrastructure and media literacy, and safeguarding civil liberties through legal and institutional protections.

Ultimately, a more participatory and equitable democracy in Thailand depends on the ability of state and civil society actors to bridge social divides, empower excluded populations, and institutionalize democratic norms that transcend elite interests. Only through such inclusive transformation can Thailand realize the full potential of its democratic aspirations.

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# The Role of Social Media in Political Engagement among Thai Youth[*]

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**Abstract**

This paper explores the role of social media in shaping political engagement among Thai youth. It examines how digital platforms facilitate access to alternative political information, foster peer-based discourse, and support protest mobilization, particularly during the 2020–21 student-led movements. Drawing on concepts such as connective action, political efficacy, and media ecology, the study also highlights the structural limitations of online activism in Thailand, including censorship, misinformation, surveillance, and the digital divide. The analysis underscores that while social media empowers youth political participation, its transformative potential remains constrained by legal repression and uneven access to digital and civic education. The paper concludes by calling for policy reforms that promote digital rights, media literacy, and inclusive governance to sustain democratic engagement in the digital age.

**Keywords**: Thai youth, Political engagement, Social media, Digital activism, Censorship

**Introduction**

Political engagement in Thailand has undergone significant transformations in recent decades, particularly in response to cycles of authoritarianism and democratic aspirations. Historically, political participation was shaped by hierarchical patron-client relationships and limited electoral engagement (Phongpaichit & Baker, 2004). However, in the post-2006 and post-2014 coup periods, traditional forms of civic participation were curtailed by legal and institutional repression, prompting new modalities of engagement—particularly among youth.

Amid growing disillusionment with entrenched elites, young Thais have emerged as key actors in challenging political orthodoxy. The youth-led movements of 2020–2021, organized largely online through platforms such as Twitter (now X), Facebook, and TikTok, marked a turning point in Thai civic life. These movements

demanded constitutional reform, monarchical accountability, and educational transformation, signaling a generational rupture with past political cultures (Sattayanurak, 2021).

Social media has been central to this evolution. It provides a relatively accessible space for political expression, mobilization, and identity formation—especially for digital natives. These platforms allow youth to bypass traditional media censorship, organize flash protests, and engage in meme-based satire that communicates complex political dissent in culturally resonant ways (Montesano, 2021; Thanaporn, 2022). Hashtag activism (e.g., #WhatHappenedInThailand, #SaveParit, #BananaRepublic) has demonstrated the power of decentralized, networked participation in shaping public discourse and contesting state narratives (Sinpeng, 2021).

However, the use of social media for political engagement is not without constraints. Thailand's restrictive legal environment—especially the enforcement of lèse majesté laws and the Computer Crime Act—has produced a climate of surveillance and self-censorship (Human Rights Watch, 2020). Moreover, online spaces often foster misinformation, digital echo chambers, and performative "slacktivism," which may weaken long-term movement sustainability and inclusive political education (Lee & Lee, 2022).

This paper explores the dual role of social media as both an enabler and inhibitor of political engagement among Thai youth. It argues that while digital platforms have empowered youth to participate in civic life in unprecedented ways, they also introduce new forms of risk, inequality, and repression. The analysis will unpack how Thai youth engage politically online, what drives their activism, and what socio-political barriers they confront in doing so.

## Conceptualizing Political Engagement in the Digital Age

In understanding the political behavior of Thai youth in the digital era, it is essential to define key concepts that shape both theory and analysis. Political participation refers broadly to activities undertaken by citizens to influence political outcomes—ranging from voting and campaigning to protesting and petitioning (Verba, Schlozman, & Brady, 1995). Civic engagement, while closely related, encompasses a broader spectrum of involvement in public life, including community activism, volunteerism, and discourse in the public sphere (Putnam, 2000). Digital activism, or "cyberactivism," refers specifically to political actions mediated through digital technologies such as social media, blogs, and messaging platforms. These forms of activism can range from awareness-raising campaigns to coordinated mass mobilizations and even forms of symbolic protest such as memes and hashtags (Tufekci, 2017).

A crucial distinction exists between traditional and digital forms of political participation. Traditional participation typically includes structured, institutionalized

acts such as voting, joining political parties, or attending rallies. In contrast, digital participation is decentralized, informal, and often individualized, encompassing activities like liking or sharing political content, engaging in online discussions, and organizing or joining online protest events (Theocharis & van Deth, 2018). In Thailand, this shift has been especially pronounced among youth who, facing restrictive political environments, find social media to be a safer and more accessible space for political expression (Sinpeng, 2021).

The motivations for political engagement among Thai youth include dissatisfaction with systemic inequality, frustration over authoritarian governance, and inspiration from global youth movements. These motivations are often intensified by the affective and viral nature of social media, which facilitates immediate feedback and a sense of community (Lee & Lee, 2022). However, significant barriers remain, such as fear of legal repercussions under Thailand's stringent lèse majesté laws, low trust in institutions, digital surveillance, and limited political education (Human Rights Watch, 2020; Sattayanurak, 2021). Generationally, youth political engagement also reflects broader identity shifts—favoring issue-based, horizontal movements over hierarchical or partisan affiliations (Montesano, 2021).

Several theoretical frameworks help interpret these emerging dynamics:

1. Connective Action Theory (Bennett & Segerberg, 2012) posits that contemporary political engagement increasingly relies on personalized content sharing through digital networks. Unlike traditional collective action, which is coordinated through formal organizations, connective action thrives in loosely connected digital ecosystems where individuals engage through shared hashtags, memes, and personal narratives.

2. Political efficacy—the belief that one's participation can influence political processes—is both a predictor and outcome of engagement. Research suggests that online participation can increase internal efficacy (confidence in one's abilities) and external efficacy (perception of institutional responsiveness), which in turn fosters further engagement (Zmerli & van Deth, 2009).

3. The Media Ecology framework emphasizes how technological environments shape human perception and behavior (McLuhan, 1964). In this context, platform affordances—such as TikTok's algorithmic virality or Twitter's real-time information flow—affect the form, reach, and symbolic impact of political engagement (Couldry & Hepp, 2017). These digital architectures enable new forms of political communication that can bypass traditional gatekeeping but also expose users to manipulation and surveillance.

Collectively, these frameworks illuminate how social media is not merely a tool for communication but a transformative space where political identity, community, and agency are constructed and contested—especially for politically aware but structurally marginalized youth in Thailand.

**Social Media Landscape in Thailand**

Thailand's digital ecosystem is a dynamic and contested space that reflects broader tensions between political expression and authoritarian constraint. Social media platforms have become crucial channels through which Thai citizens—especially youth—access political information, engage in discourse, and mobilize for action. However, this landscape is heavily shaped by state censorship, cultural taboos, and strategic navigation of digital affordances.

**1. Popular Platforms: Facebook, Twitter (X), TikTok, and Line**

The most widely used platforms in Thailand are Facebook, Twitter (now X), TikTok, and Line, each serving distinct functions in the realm of political engagement. Facebook remains the dominant platform for general communication and organizing, particularly among older users and grassroots activists. It has been instrumental in hosting pages such as "Free Youth" and "Thalufah," which coordinate protest activities and share political content (Sinpeng, 2021).

Twitter, by contrast, has become the preferred space for political discussion among urban youth due to its real-time broadcasting capabilities, anonymity, and culture of hashtag activism. During the 2020–2021 pro-democracy protests, hashtags like #SaveParit, #WhatHappenedInThailand, and #ReformTheMonarchy trended globally, amplifying domestic dissent on the international stage (Lee & Lee, 2022).

TikTok, originally a space for entertainment and dance trends, has evolved into a subversive platform for political satire, parody, and meme activism. Young Thais use it to critique the military, monarchy, and elite structures in creative, humorous formats that both bypass direct censorship and appeal to peer audiences (Thanaporn, 2022). Meanwhile, Line, a messaging app integrated with daily life in Thailand, is used for private coordination of protests, secure dissemination of political material, and direct messaging among activist groups (DigitalReach, 2021).

**2. Censorship Laws and Digital Surveillance**

Despite the vibrancy of online expression, Thailand has one of the most restrictive digital environments in Southeast Asia. The lèse majesté law (Article 112 of the Criminal Code) criminalizes defamation of the monarchy with penalties of up to 15 years per offense, and has been broadly used against youth activists and even online users who retweet or "like" critical content (Human Rights Watch, 2020).

The Computer Crime Act (CCA), revised in 2017, further empowers the state to surveil, block, and prosecute online content under ambiguous terms such as "threat to national security." These laws have created a chilling effect, where users engage in self-censorship, delete posts, or rely on coded language and satire to express dissent (Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 2021).

The state has also developed programs such as "Cyber Scouts"—youth volunteers trained to monitor and report online behaviors deemed harmful to the monarchy or national unity (Sinpeng, 2020). Additionally, digital surveillance is deployed through AI-based systems and cooperation with platform companies, raising concerns about the erosion of online privacy and freedom of expression.

### 3. Influencers, Meme Culture, and Anonymity in Thai Political Discourse

Thai political discourse online is heavily shaped by influencers, some of whom blend lifestyle content with subtle political messaging. Figures like "Netiwit Chotiphatphaisal" and anonymous parody accounts such as "The METTAD" have amassed large followings for their critiques of the status quo, often employing humor, irony, and visual culture to attract youth audiences (Montesano, 2021).

Meme culture—especially during the protests—has become a form of "vernacular resistance" where young users adapt pop culture tropes, anime references, or national symbols to critique political authorities. This not only lowers the barrier to participation but also fosters a shared identity among digitally active youth (Tufekci, 2017; Thanaporn, 2022).

Anonymity is also a critical feature. Many youth activists rely on pseudonyms or anonymous accounts to shield their identities, especially when discussing sensitive topics like monarchy reform. This practice reflects the high-risk nature of political expression in Thailand, but also demonstrates resilience and tactical adaptation within digital spaces.

### 4. Hybrid Spaces of Expression: Satire, Protest Hashtags, and Viral Content

Thai digital activism operates within a hybrid media space that blends formal political critique with entertainment and affective storytelling. Satirical content—often humorous or absurdist—allows dissent to circulate under the radar of censorship, using ambiguity and shared cultural codes to critique powerful institutions (Chumchan & Niyomsilp, 2022).

Protest hashtags function as rallying points, not only organizing offline actions but also aggregating discourse, building narratives, and framing political debates. Viral content, such as protest TikToks or Twitter threads, serves both to mobilize participants and to internationalize the Thai struggle for democracy (Sinpeng, 2021).

These practices represent a form of digital insurgency in which expression is mediated not just by platforms but also by a deeply aware and adaptive youth culture that knows how to navigate repression while amplifying collective political voices.

### Drivers of Youth Engagement through Social Media

The rise of youth political participation in Thailand over the past decade is deeply intertwined with the growth of digital technologies and social media platforms. These technologies have created new opportunities for political awareness, identity formation, and mobilization—especially in a context where traditional political spaces are limited or repressed. Several key drivers explain how and why social media fosters political engagement among Thai youth.

### 1. Access to Political Information and Alternative Narratives

One of the most significant contributions of social media to youth engagement is its role in providing unfiltered access to political information. Unlike traditional media in Thailand, which is often state-influenced or self-censoring, platforms like Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube allow users to access alternative viewpoints, investigative journalism, and dissident voices (Sinpeng, 2021). This is especially vital

in a country where state-controlled narratives dominate mainstream channels and laws such as the lèse majesté provision restrict public discussion about the monarchy.

Through digital media, youth gain exposure to content that challenges hegemonic discourse, such as critiques of military rule, royal privilege, and judicial politicization (Sattayanurak, 2021). Independent sources, activist accounts, and grassroots news outlets like The Reporters or Voice TV serve as key nodes in the digital information ecosystem. The availability of such content contributes to greater political awareness and critical thinking, enabling youth to question institutional authority and engage with broader democratic ideals.

## 2. Peer-to-Peer Political Discourse and Community Formation

Beyond information consumption, social media fosters horizontal communication and deliberation. Platforms enable peer-to-peer interactions that are informal, dialogical, and identity-affirming. Thai youth often engage in discussions through memes, comment threads, and group chats that create a shared vocabulary of dissent (Lee & Lee, 2022). These interactions cultivate a sense of belonging to a political community, even in the absence of formal party structures or civic organizations.

Digital spaces such as fan pages, Twitter threads, and Discord servers operate as affective communities, where users exchange not only political content but also emotions, humor, and mutual support. This type of participatory culture is crucial for sustaining engagement, especially in a climate of political anxiety and legal repression (Jermsittiparsert & Rattanaphan, 2021).

## 3. Mobilization and Protest Coordination (e.g., 2020–21 Student-Led Movements)

Social media has also proven essential in coordinating offline political actions. The 2020–2021 youth-led protest movements in Thailand, inspired by frustrations with military rule, educational authoritarianism, and calls for monarchy reform, were largely organized through digital platforms (Montesano, 2021). Hashtags such as #RespectYouthVoice, #FreeYouth, and #ReformTheMonarchy acted as rallying points that both aggregated sentiment and guided collective action.

Twitter was especially instrumental in real-time updates during protests, while Facebook events and Telegram channels were used to disseminate logistics such as locations, protest tactics, and legal assistance (DigitalReach, 2021). This form of decentralized, networked coordination allowed the movement to persist despite arrests, legal intimidation, and physical suppression.

Moreover, the visual culture of protests—placards, costumes, and symbolic gestures—was carefully curated and amplified online, making the demonstrations not only political events but also media spectacles designed for viral circulation.

## 4. Role of Digital Literacy and Civic Education in Engagement Quality

While access and participation are essential, the quality of political engagement is shaped by the level of digital literacy and civic education among youth. Digital literacy involves the ability to critically evaluate online content, verify sources, and resist manipulation. High levels of digital literacy correlate with more meaningful

political participation, including issue-based discussion and active deliberation rather than passive sharing or performative "slacktivism" (Chantarasat & Pheunpha, 2022).

In Thailand, however, civic education has traditionally focused on promoting loyalty to the nation, religion, and monarchy, rather than fostering democratic values or critical citizenship (Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 2021). In response, NGOs and progressive educators have attempted to fill the gap through workshops, alternative curricula, and online campaigns that promote critical thinking, human rights awareness, and democratic dialogue.

The intersection of digital and civic literacy is therefore pivotal. Empowering youth to understand not only how to navigate social media but also how to interpret its content and political context enhances the depth and durability of their engagement.

## Risks and Limitations of Social Media Political Engagement

While social media has expanded the horizons of youth political participation in Thailand, it also introduces a range of structural and behavioral limitations that constrain the quality, sustainability, and inclusivity of such engagement. These risks can dilute the democratic potential of digital platforms and in some cases reinforce existing inequalities or generate new forms of political harm.

### 1. Misinformation and Echo Chambers

One of the most pervasive problems in digital political engagement is the spread of misinformation. On platforms like Facebook and Twitter, where algorithmic feeds prioritize engagement over accuracy, false or misleading content spreads rapidly—especially during moments of political crisis or protest (Chantarasat & Pheunpha, 2022). Thai youth, despite being tech-savvy, are often exposed to partisan narratives, conspiracy theories, and unverifiable information.

This is compounded by the formation of echo chambers—closed digital environments in which users are predominantly exposed to information that confirms their existing beliefs. These echo chambers hinder deliberative dialogue, reinforce ideological polarization, and can lead to radicalization or political disillusionment (Sinpeng, 2021). In the Thai context, such dynamics deepen generational and ideological divides, particularly around contentious topics like monarchy reform or military governance.

### 2. "Slacktivism" vs. Sustained Activism

The ease of online participation also raises concerns about "slacktivism"—a term used to describe low-effort digital actions (liking, sharing, hashtagging) that substitute for deeper political commitment or sustained offline engagement (Morozov, 2011). While such actions can raise awareness, they may fail to translate into institutional change or long-term movement building.

In the Thai case, many protest hashtags have trended globally, but sustaining engagement beyond viral moments has proven difficult due to repression, fatigue, and the lack of organizational infrastructure (Montesano, 2021). Moreover, the reliance on digital expression can sometimes dilute the strategic coherence of movements, as diverse actors engage in fragmented, symbolic performances rather than coordinated political agendas.

### 3. Digital Surveillance and Self-Censorship

Thailand's repressive digital environment poses a significant risk to online political actors. The Computer Crime Act and lèse majesté laws have been systematically used to monitor, charge, and imprison users for content deemed threatening to the monarchy or national security (Human Rights Watch, 2020). This legal climate produces a chilling effect, where users—especially youth—engage in self-censorship, obscure their identities, or refrain from participating in political discussions altogether.

Surveillance technologies are further reinforced by programs like Cyber Scouts, where students are recruited to monitor peers' online behavior (Sinpeng, 2020). Activists report increased anxiety, digital harassment, and the need to migrate to encrypted platforms, which in turn limits the openness and inclusivity of digital political spaces.

### 4. Online Harassment, Trolling, and Polarization

Social media also serves as a site of digital violence, particularly for outspoken youth activists, women, and LGBTQ+ individuals. Harassment, doxing, hate speech, and coordinated trolling campaigns are frequent tactics used by ultraroyalist groups or pro-government actors to silence dissent (Chumchan & Niyomsilp, 2022). This not only undermines political participation but also poses serious psychological risks and discourages marginalized voices from engaging in public debate.

Moreover, the toxic nature of online debate, often fueled by anonymity and polarization, has led to the breakdown of constructive discourse. Debates around monarchy reform, for example, have frequently devolved into binary conflicts that make nuanced discussion difficult, further entrenching societal divides.

### 5. Digital Divide (Urban-Rural, Socioeconomic Gaps)

Lastly, digital political engagement in Thailand is unevenly distributed. There exists a digital divide between urban and rural populations, as well as among different income groups. While urban youth in Bangkok and major cities often have high-speed internet, access to smartphones, and digital literacy, rural youth may face limited connectivity, inadequate devices, and lower levels of online engagement (Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 2021).

This divide undermines the inclusivity of digital movements, as voices from peripheral regions are underrepresented in national discourses. Furthermore, platform algorithms may privilege elite or urban narratives, reinforcing the marginalization of rural political concerns and widening the participatory gap between socio-economic classes.

## Implications for Democracy and Policy in Thailand

The interplay between social media and youth political engagement in Thailand has significant consequences for the evolution of the country's democratic culture, state-society relations, and policymaking. While digital platforms have empowered young citizens to participate in political discourse and mobilization, they have also exposed the structural limitations of Thailand's political system. The following subsections address the key democratic and policy implications arising from these developments.

### 1. How Digital Platforms Shift Political Culture Among Youth

Social media has fundamentally altered the political culture of Thai youth by fostering values of autonomy, decentralization, and expressive participation. Unlike previous generations, which often operated within patronage networks and hierarchical party structures, young Thais now engage through horizontal, personalized, and issue-based interactions (Bennett & Segerberg, 2012). Platforms such as Twitter, TikTok, and Facebook have not only amplified political grievances but also created new avenues for forming alternative civic identities that challenge traditional norms of deference and silence.

The 2020–21 student-led movements illustrate this shift, as youth organizers demanded not only procedural democratic reforms but also structural transformations of the monarchy, military, and education systems. These demands emerged organically from online discussions and were expressed through culturally resonant forms such as memes, satire, and protest fashion—demonstrating that aesthetic and affective expression has become central to Thailand's emerging youth-led political culture (Thanaporn, 2022; Montesano, 2021).

### 2. Impact on Democratic Norms, Civic Education, and Participation

The increased use of digital platforms has redefined key democratic norms, including freedom of expression, pluralism, and political accountability. While traditional institutions—such as political parties, schools, and mass media—have failed to fully adapt, social media has become the de facto public sphere where issues are debated, movements organized, and power critiqued (Sinpeng, 2021). However, the absence of structured civic education and the dominance of pro-authoritarian narratives in Thai curricula limit the ability of youth to engage critically and sustainably in this digital democratic space (Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 2021).

Civic education in Thailand often emphasizes loyalty to the monarchy and state rather than democratic participation or critical citizenship. As a result, youth political engagement via social media remains reactive and emotionally driven, with limited institutional translation. Without systemic reform in civic education, the risk remains that digital activism will remain performative rather than transformative (Chantarasat & Pheunpha, 2022).

### 3. State Response: Repression vs. Reform

The Thai state's response to digital activism has been predominantly repressive. Authorities have invoked the lèse majesté law (Article 112), the Computer Crime Act, and emergency decrees to arrest, surveil, and silence online dissenters (Human Rights Watch, 2020). During the 2020 protests alone, over 150 activists—many of them minors or university students—faced legal charges for their online and offline expression (DigitalReach, 2021).

This strategy of criminalization and surveillance has generated a climate of fear, pushing activists toward anonymous accounts, encrypted platforms, and self-censorship. At the same time, there are emerging reformist voices within civil society, opposition parties, and academia calling for greater protection of digital rights, repeal of draconian laws, and institutional safeguards for online freedoms (Lee & Lee, 2022).

The tension between repression and reform reflects a broader conflict between authoritarian resilience and democratic aspiration. Without genuine institutional change, youth discontent may deepen, and political polarization may intensify.

The Need for Digital Rights, Media Literacy Education, and Inclusive Governance

To harness the democratic potential of youth digital engagement, Thailand must invest in a rights-based digital framework. This includes reforming restrictive laws (e.g., repealing Article 112), ensuring online privacy protections, and guaranteeing the freedom of digital expression within democratic boundaries (Sinpeng, 2020).

Furthermore, media literacy education must be embedded within national curricula to equip young citizens with the tools to critically assess political information, resist misinformation, and engage responsibly in digital public spheres (Chantarasat & Pheunpha, 2022). This also entails recognizing and integrating youth perspectives into governance processes—whether through youth councils, digital policy consultations, or civic innovation labs.

Ultimately, fostering inclusive governance requires that the state view youth not as threats to national unity but as stakeholders in democratic renewal. Digital activism should not be criminalized but rather channeled through participatory mechanisms that allow institutional responsiveness, accountability, and intergenerational dialogue.

**Conclusion**

The emergence of social media as a central arena for political engagement among Thai youth represents both a transformative and contested development in the country's democratic trajectory. Platforms such as Facebook, Twitter (X), TikTok, and Line have enabled young people to access alternative political narratives, form peer-based political communities, and mobilize for collective action in ways that transcend the limitations of traditional institutions. These digital spaces have cultivated new political identities and modes of expression—particularly among the post-2006 and post-2014 generations—that are characterized by creativity, irreverence, and horizontal participation.

However, the democratic promise of social media is deeply constrained by structural risks and political repression. The spread of misinformation, formation of ideological echo chambers, and prevalence of "slacktivism" raise critical concerns about the sustainability and quality of youth political participation. More seriously, Thailand's repressive legal environment—including the lèse majesté law and Computer Crime Act—continues to criminalize digital dissent and foster widespread self-censorship. Combined with state surveillance, online harassment, and digital inequality, these forces threaten to fragment and marginalize the very communities that digital technologies have empowered.

The implications for Thai democracy are profound. While youth-led digital engagement reflects an expanding public consciousness and desire for reform, the absence of supportive institutional frameworks—such as inclusive civic education, digital rights protections, and participatory governance—risks neutralizing this momentum. Bridging the gap between online activism and democratic transformation

will require not only legal reform and media literacy but also a genuine reconfiguration of how the state views and engages its youth citizens.

Ultimately, social media has become a **double-edged instrument** in the hands of Thai youth: a tool for liberation and self-expression, but also a site of control, fragmentation, and vulnerability. Whether digital engagement will evolve into a durable force for democratic renewal depends on the choices made by policymakers, educators, and young people themselves in negotiating the promises and perils of the digital political age.

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# <mark>Author Guidelines</mark>
# Asian Journal of Humanities and Social Innovation (AJHSI)

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## 1. Publication Policy in Asian Journal of Humanities and Social Innovation

Asian Journal of Humanities and Social Innovation (AJHSI) is a journal in the humanities and social sciences. It aims to promote research and publish research articles, academic articles, review articles, and book reviews for scholars, researchers, lecturers, students at all levels, and interested persons in the dimensions of Sociologies, Anthropologies, Humanities, Social Sciences, Education, Business Administration, Politics, Public Administration, Development, Tourism, and other areas in Social Sciences. Articles that are considered for publication must be reviewed by at least 2 out of 3 qualified persons (Peer Review). Only English articles are considered for publication. Submitted works must not have been published or are under consideration by qualified persons for publication in other journals. Authors must strictly comply with the criteria for submitting academic or research articles for publication in the journal, and the referencing system must be in accordance with the criteria of the journal.

The views and opinions expressed in journal articles are the responsibility of the authors of the articles and are not the opinions of the editorial team. The editorial team does not reserve the right to copy but requires references to show the source.

Publication Frequency
Release scheduled of four issues per year (Biweekly 3 months per time):
Issue 1 January – March
Issue 2 April – June
Issue 3 July - September
Issue 4 October – December

## 2 . Types of works published in the Asian Journal of Humanities and Social Innovation

1. Research Article is a report of the results of a systematic study, research, or development.

2. An Academic Article is a work of writing an interesting topic in which the author presents new knowledge by using theories, concepts, and related research results as information sources.

3. Review Article is an article that combines theories, concepts, and research results on many subjects, the author will synthesize the literature to compile it into a conclusion or argument on a particular matter, which is a review of the academic progress of that matter.

## 3. Guidelines for Manuscript Preparation and Submission

## Research Articles

### Title
The title should be precise, concise, and accurately reflect the article's content and focus. Clearly specify the title: AJAJ - Writing Article Titles with Initial Capital Letters. (Times New Roman, 14 pt, Bold)

### Author's name and surname
Full names of all authors, without including any titles, ranks, or honorifics. For multiple authors, separate the names with commas, and for the last author, use "and." (Times New Roman, 12 pt, Bold)

### Full Address
Affair and country
*E-mail:*
Received xx/xx/20xx          Revised xx/xx/20xx          Accepted xx/xx/20xx
*(Times New Roman, 11 pt, Italic)*

### Abstract

The abstract should succinctly summarize the article, including its objectives, methodology, key findings, and discussion, all within 300-400 words. The abstract must be written as a single, coherent paragraph. Text (Times New Roman, 11 pt, Tab 0.5 cm)

**Keywords:** Keyword, keyword, keyword
Authors should provide a minimum of three keywords and a maximum of five, reflecting the core themes of the study. (Times New Roman, 11 pt; 5 keywords/phrases

### Introduction
The introduction of a research paper is a crucial component, as it is the first section that readers encounter to understand the topic under investigation. A well-written introduction should begin by presenting the general background of the issue or topic, gradually narrowing down to the specific problem that the researcher intends to explore. It should also highlight the significance and necessity of conducting the research.

Furthermore, the introduction should point out the gap in existing knowledge that the research aims to fill. It must clearly state the objectives of the study to ensure that readers can comprehend the rationale, importance, and direction of the research. A well-structured and thoughtful introduction not only enhances the credibility of the

study but also engages the reader's interest to continue exploring the entire research paper. Text (Times New Roman, 11 pt, Tab 0.5 cm)

**Objectives**
1.
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3.
Text (Times New Roman, 11 pt, Tab 0.5 cm)

**Literature review**
The literature review is a crucial component of the research process. Its primary purpose is to explore relevant information, concepts, theories, and previous studies related to the research topic. A thorough literature review helps researchers understand the current state of knowledge, identify academic trends, and recognize gaps that need further investigation.

A high-quality literature review involves the careful selection of credible, up-to-date, and directly relevant sources. Researchers should analyze, synthesize, and compare information from various references to establish a clear conceptual framework or research hypothesis. Moreover, the literature review enhances the credibility of the study and demonstrates that the researcher has a deep and comprehensive understanding of the topic being studied. Text (Times New Roman, 11 pt, Tab 0.5 cm)

**Methodology**
The methodology section is a critical part of a research study that outlines the systematic process for data collection, analysis, and presentation of research findings. A well-written methodology clearly specifies the type of research—whether it is quantitative, qualitative, or mixed-methods—and explains the sampling procedures, research instruments, data collection steps, and data analysis techniques.

An appropriately designed methodology ensures that the research questions can be accurately addressed and enhances the **credibility** and **reliability** of the study. Furthermore, a clear methodology provides a framework that allows other researchers to replicate the study if they wish to explore the same topic in future research. Text (Times New Roman, 11 pt, Tab 0.5 cm)

**Results**
The results section presents the findings derived from the analysis of collected data based on the established research methodology. At this stage, no interpretations or personal opinions from the researcher should be included. The presentation of results must be clear, organized, and aligned with the research objectives.

Results can be conveyed through narrative descriptions, tables, charts, or figures to make the information easier to understand and compare. The language used should be neutral and objective, avoiding any exaggeration or interpretation beyond what the data reveals.

A well-structured results section enables readers to connect the findings directly with the research questions and objectives. It also lays the foundation for the discussion and interpretation that follows in the next section of the research paper. Text (Times New Roman, 11 pt, Tab 0.5 cm)

**Discussion**

The discussion section is a vital component that demonstrates the researcher's ability to interpret and critically analyze the findings in relation to the research objectives, hypotheses, and relevant literature or theories. The researcher should connect the results to theoretical frameworks and explain whether the findings support or contradict previous studies.

This section should include logical reasoning, possible explanations, and factors that may have influenced the results. It is also important to address any limitations of the study that could affect the accuracy or applicability of the findings.

A well-written discussion reflects academic depth and shows that the researcher understands the broader context of the research. It bridges the gap between raw findings and the implications they may have for theory, practice, or future studies. Text (Times New Roman, 11 pt, Tab 0.5 cm)

**Conclusion**

The conclusion of a research paper provides a concise, clear, and complete summary of the key findings in alignment with the study's objectives. It should not introduce any new information or data, but rather synthesize what has already been discussed to highlight whether the research questions were effectively answered or the research goals were achieved.

A strong conclusion also includes practical implications or recommendations based on the findings, and often suggests directions for future research to expand upon areas that remain unexplored or insufficiently studied. A well-crafted conclusion helps readers quickly grasp the core contributions of the study and appreciate its academic value. Text (Times New Roman, 11 pt, Tab 0.5 cm)

**Recommendation**

The **recommendation** section is an important component of a research paper, demonstrating how the findings can be applied in practice or used to inform future research. Recommendations should be based on the results and conclusions of the study, focusing on areas that can be developed, improved, or addressed more effectively.

Recommendations are typically divided into two categories:

1. **Practical or policy-related recommendations** – for implementation by organizations, institutions, or stakeholders.

2. **Recommendations for future research** – for exploring unresolved issues or expanding on the current study's findings.

Effective recommendations should be **clear, feasible, and relevant** to the context of the research problem, offering meaningful guidance for both practitioners and future scholars. Text (Times New Roman, 11 pt, Tab 0.5 cm)

### References
References must adhere to the *APA 7th Edition* guidelines. All cited works should follow the *American Psychological Association* referencing style, particularly for articles in foreign languages.
Text (Times New Roman, 11 pt, Tab 0.5 cm)

## Academic Articles:

# Title
The title should be precise, concise, and accurately reflect the article's content and focus. Clearly specify the title: AJAJ - Writing Article Titles with Initial Capital Letters. (Times New Roman, 14 pt, Bold)

### Author's name and surname
Full names of all authors, without including any titles, ranks, or honorifics. For multiple authors, separate the names with commas, and for the last author, use "and." (Times New Roman, 12 pt, Bold)

### Full Address
Affair and country
*E-mail:*
Received xx/xx/20xx                Revised xx/xx/20xx                Accepted xx/xx/20xx
*(Times New Roman, 11 pt, Italic)*

### Abstract
The abstract should succinctly summarize the article, including its objectives, methodology, key findings, and discussion, all within 300-400 words. The abstract must be written as a single, coherent paragraph. Text (Times New Roman, 11 pt, Tab 0.5 cm)

**Keywords:** Keyword, keyword, keyword
Authors should provide a minimum of three keywords and a maximum of five, reflecting the core themes of the study. (Times New Roman, 11 pt; 5 keywords/phrases

### Main Text
The manuscript should be structured into an introduction, followed by the main body, with clear subheadings or sections to enhance readability. Authors' identities must not

be discernible  from the text; any self-references should use the term "author(s)" instead of personal names.
Text (Times New Roman, 11 pt, Tab 0.5 cm)

## Conclusion
Text (Times New Roman, 11 pt, Tab 0.5 cm)

## Acknowledgments
This section should acknowledge sources of research funding, institutional or personal support, and any contributions from generative AI tools, if applicable**.**
Text (Times New Roman, 11 pt, Tab 0.5 cm)

## References
References must adhere to the *APA 7th Edition* guidelines. All cited works should follow the *American Psychological Association* referencing style, particularly for articles in foreign languages.
Text (Times New Roman, 11 pt, Tab 0.5 cm)

## Appendix
 If applicable, supplementary materials or data may be included as appendices.
Text (Times New Roman, 11 pt, Tab 0.5 cm)

## Highlight
Authors are requested to provide a concise summary that encapsulates the key arguments and significance of their article. This summary should not exceed 50 words and should effectively convey the central themes and contributions of the study, enabling readers to quickly understand the article's primary focus and relevance.

## Graphical Abstracts
A graphical abstract is a single, concise, and pictorial summary of the article's main findings. It may be the concluding figure from the article or a specially designed image.

1. **Image Size:** Provide an image with a minimum resolution of **531 × 1328 pixels** (height × width) at **300 dpi**. For larger images, maintain the same aspect ratio (e.g., **200 × 500**).
2. **File Type:** Preferred formats include **TIFF, PNG, and JPEG**.
3. **Content:** Do not include additional text, outlines, or synopses outside the image. Any text or labels must be integrated within the image itself.

*** (Attached as a separate file) Name the file **Graphical Abstracts)**.

**Figure X** Text  (Source: XXXXX) (Times New Roman, 10 pt, Align Text Left)

**Figure 1** Asian Journal of Humanities and Social Innovation (AJHSI), 2024



**Figure 1** Asian Journal of Humanities and Social Innovation (AJHSI), 2020

**Table 1** Table Title

| No. | Name | Mean |
|-----|------|------|
| 1 | A | 0.00 |
| 2 | B | 0.00 |

**Table 1** Experts specializing in the Nora performance

| No. | Name | Expertise |
|-----|------|-----------|
| 1 | | |
| 2 | | |

## References

Cite references in APA 7th edition in the manuscript

Standard references and referencing methods in APA - American Psychological Association for Foreign Language

**Reference example** APA (American Psychological Association) 7th

Include the complete citation at the end of your paper in a **references** section. References are organized by the author's last name in alphabetic (A-Z) order. Use an hanging indent to separate each list item.

**Basic Format:**

Author, A. A., & Author, B. B. (Date). Title of the work. *Source where you can retrieve the work*. URL or DOI if available

## Journal Article

**Author(s).** Note: List each author's last name and initial as Author, A. A., Author, B. B., & Author, C. C. Use an ampersand (&) before the final author's name. Read more from the APA Style website if there are 21 or more authors.

1. **(Year).**
2. **Title of the article.** Note: For works that are part of a greater whole (e.g. articles, chapter), use sentence case. Only the first word of the title and subtitle and proper nouns are capitalized.
3. *Title of the Journal,* Note: Italicize and capitalize each word in the journal.
4. *Volume* Note: Italicize the journal volume. If there is no issue, include a comma before the page range.
5. **(Issue),** Note: If there is a issue number in addition to a volume number, include it in parentheses.
6. **Page range.** Note: If there is no page range within the journal volume/issue, this can be excluded.

7. **DOI (Digital Object Identifier)** Read more about DOIs from the APA Style wesbite.

Phathong, K., & Kenaphoom, S. (2024). Changes in Family Structure and Social Roles in Thai Rural Communities. *Asian Journal of Humanities and Social Innovation*, *1*(1), 1–15. https://doi.org/10.

## Online News/Magazine Article

1. **Author(s).** Note: List each author's last name and initials as Author, A. A., Author, B. B., & Author, C. C. Use an ampersand (&) before the final author's name.
2. **(Year, Month Date).** Note: You do not need to abbreviate the month.
3. **Title of the article.** Note: For works that are part of a greater whole (e.g. articles, chapter), use sentence case. Only the first word of the title and subtitle and proper nouns are capitalized.
4. *Title of the online newspaper or publication.* Note: Capitalize each word in the publication and italicize. If the publication has an associated newly newspaper in print, use the newspaper article reference example .
5. **URL**

Phathong, K. (2021, December 30). Educational Inequality Between Urban and Rural Communities: A Case Study in Northeastern Thailand. https://so14.tci-thaijo.org/index.php/AJHSI

## Book

1. **Author(s).** Note: List each author's last name and initials as Author, A. A., Author, B. B., & Author, C. C. Use an ampersand (&) before the final author's name.
2. **(Year).**
3. *Title of the book.* Note: For works that stand alone (e.g. books, reports), italicize the title. Only capitalize the first word of the title and subtitle and any proper nouns.
4. **(Edition).** Note: If there is an edition or volume, include it in parentheses and use abbreviations of ed. or vol.
5. **Publisher.** Note: You do not need to include the publisher location or databases where you retrieved it.

Phathong, K. (2021). *Analyzing Income Disparities and Social Mobility in Developing Economies.* Asian Journal of Humanities and Social Innovation Publishing.

## Book Chapter with Editor(s)

1. **Author(s).** Note: List each chapter author's last name and initials as Author, A. A., Author, B. B., & Author, C. C. Use an ampersand (&) before the final author's name.
2. **(Year).**
3. **Title of the chapter.** Note: For works that are part of a greater whole (e.g. articles, chapter), use sentence case. Only the first word of the title and subtitle and proper nouns are capitalized.
4. **In Editor(s),** Note: List each editor's last name and initials as A. A. Editor, B. B. Editor, & C. C. Editors, include (Ed.) or (Eds.) in parentheses, and end with a comma.
5. *Title of the book* Note: For works that stand alone (e.g. books, reports), italicize the title. Only capitalize the first word of the title and subtitle and any proper nouns.
6. **(pp.xx-xx).**
7. **Publisher.** Note: You do not need to include the publisher location or databases where you retrieved it.

Hattha, K.(2012). Three southern border provinces, Thai history before the Sukhothai period to the   present. In Thepthai,K.  (Eds.), Dimensions of culture, history, and visions of the future: Restoring peace to the southern border provinces. (pp. 1-19). Ministry of Culture.

# The process of reviewing articles in the Asian Journal of Humanities and Social Innovation



## Peer Review Process

### Step 1. Manuscript Submission

Authors begin by preparing their manuscripts according to the ACAJ format and submitting them through the user-friendly ThaiJO online system. This system ensures the smooth receipt, processing, and review of manuscripts by the AJAC editorial team. The streamlined process maintains order and consistency, enabling efficient review and publication.

### Step 2. Initial Check (2 Weeks)

Upon receipt of the manuscript, the editorial team conducts an initial assessment to ensure that the submission aligns with the journal's scope and complies with publication

requirements. Manuscripts that fail to meet these criteria are rejected without further review. Submissions with a similarity index exceeding 30% are also rejected at this stage. Additionally, the editorial team also checks the article's formatting and citation style according to the specified author guidelines. Manuscripts that do not meet these requirements are returned to authors for reformatting and resubmission. If approved, the manuscript proceeds to the review stage.

**Step 3. Associate Editor Assignment (2 Weeks)**
Following the initial review, the Editor-in-Chief assigns an Associate Editor with relevant expertise to oversee the review process. The Associate Editor identifies and invites three qualified reviewers with expertise in fields related to the manuscript's scope. If the initial invitations are not accepted, additional reviewers are invited. This process typically takes 2 weeks.

**Step 4. Reviewer Invitation and Review Process (6-12 Weeks)**
ACAJ employs a double-blinded review system with a minimum of 3 expert reviewers. Authors' names, affiliations, email addresses, and acknowledgments are anonymized by the editor before inviting reviewers. Invited reviewers should be affiliated with institutions distinct from the corresponding author. This step generally takes 6-12 weeks.

**Step 5. Final Decision by Editor-in-Chief (2-4 Weeks)**
The Editor-in-Chief, along with the Associate Editors, reviews the evaluation reports, comments, and recommendations provided by the reviewers. A final decision is made, which may be one of the following: Accept Submission, Revisions Required, Resubmit for Review, or Decline Submission. The final decision is communicated to the author via the ThaiJO system. If the decision is "Revisions Required" or "Resubmit for Review," the author has 2-4 weeks to submit the revised manuscript.

**Step 6. Author Proofreading and English Editing (2 Weeks)**
The author(s) engage in proofreading and ensure language accuracy through a professional editor. They must respond to queries from the language editor and improve any low-quality figures. The corresponding author signs the copyright transfer form on behalf of all co-authors to ensure completion within approximately 2 weeks.

**Step 7. Final Corrections and Publication (2 Weeks)**
After the final manuscript is submitted, it is sent to the Assistant Editor for formatting and article design in accordance with the journal's guidelines. A CrossRef DOI is assigned, and the article is published on the journal's website. This final stage typically takes 2 weeks.