

# Social Inequality and Political Participation of Thai Citizens<sup>\*</sup>

**Naschana Sangchang**

*Independent Scholar, Thailand*

*E-mail: naschanasangchang@gmail.com*

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## Abstract

This article examines the intricate relationship between social inequality and political participation in Thailand. It explores how disparities in income, education, and regional development shape access to political processes, both electoral and non-electoral. Drawing on empirical data and case studies, the study highlights how marginalized communities face systemic barriers to engagement due to patronage politics, limited civic education, and legal repression. The article concludes with policy recommendations to promote inclusive participation through civic education reform, electoral restructuring, and legal protections for civil society.

**Keywords:** Social inequality, Political participation, Thailand, Civic engagement, Democracy

## Introduction

Political participation is a fundamental component of democratic societies, encompassing a range of activities such as voting, protesting, petitioning, and engaging in political discussions or civic organizations (Verba, Scholzman, & Brady, 1995). Through participation, citizens exercise their political rights, hold governments accountable, and shape public policy. The health of a democracy is often gauged by the extent and inclusiveness of political engagement among its citizens (Dahl, 1989).

However, in many countries—including Thailand—political participation is marked by significant disparities. Unequal political engagement among Thai citizens is particularly evident along lines of socioeconomic status, education, gender, and geographic location (Laathamatas, 1996; McCargo, 2019). While some groups actively engage in political processes, others remain marginalized or disengaged, often due to structural, institutional, or cultural barriers. For example, rural populations and the urban poor may face limited access to political information or be disillusioned by elite-dominated politics (Walker, 2012).

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This study addresses the critical issue of political inequality in Thailand by investigating the factors that influence varying levels of citizen participation. Understanding this gap is vital for strengthening democratic institutions and fostering inclusive governance. As Thailand has experienced cycles of democratic openings and authoritarian reversals, the dynamics of political participation offer key insights into the country's ongoing struggle for democratization and political reform (Hewison, 2014; Chambers & Waitookiat, 2016). By examining these patterns, this research contributes to the broader discourse on democratic development and the conditions necessary for effective political inclusion in transitional societies.

### **The Landscape of Social Inequality in Thailand**

Thailand presents a compelling case of persistent and multifaceted social inequality, which significantly shapes the contours of political participation and democratic development. These inequalities—economic, educational, regional, and ethnic—create structural barriers that inhibit inclusive civic engagement.

#### **1. Economic Disparities**

Thailand is characterized by stark income inequality and class-based exclusion. Despite notable economic growth over the past decades, wealth distribution remains highly skewed. According to the Credit Suisse Global Wealth Report (2018), Thailand had one of the highest wealth inequality rates in the world, with the richest 1% holding over 66.9% of the country's wealth. This economic disparity manifests in unequal access to political influence, as wealthier individuals can afford greater political engagement through campaign financing, lobbying, or elite networks (Phongpaichit & Baker, 2004).

Moreover, the dominance of informal labor—accounting for over 55% of the workforce—contributes to economic insecurity and political disenfranchisement (ILO, 2021). Informal workers often lack social protections, union representation, and access to political platforms, which hinders their ability to mobilize for collective interests. This structural economic exclusion limits their participation in formal political processes and policymaking.

#### **2. Educational Gaps**

Another critical factor is the persistent gap in educational attainment, which directly affects civic literacy and political efficacy. Education is a key determinant of political participation, as it equips individuals with the knowledge and skills to navigate complex political systems (Nie, Junn, & Stehlik-Barry, 1996). In Thailand, however, disparities in educational quality and access are pronounced between urban and rural areas. Schools in the Northeast and Deep South often face shortages of qualified teachers, instructional materials, and infrastructure (UNESCO, 2015).

These disparities have led to a widespread deficiency in civic education. As a result, many citizens—particularly in rural areas—lack access to accurate political information or the ability to critically evaluate political narratives. This reinforces voter manipulation, patron-client relationships, and political apathy among disadvantaged groups (Laothamatas, 1996).

### **3. Regional and Ethnic Dimensions**

Regional inequality is also a defining feature of Thailand's political landscape. The Northeast (Isan) and Southern border provinces have long been politically marginalized, both in terms of representation and resource allocation. Historically, Isan has been treated as a peripheral region by the Bangkok-based political establishment, despite being a populous and politically active area (Walker, 2012). The centralized nature of Thai governance has excluded many Isan voices from national policymaking, fueling resentment and identity-based mobilization, such as the Red Shirt movement.

Ethnic and indigenous minority groups—including the Malay Muslims in the South and hill tribes in the North—face systematic exclusion from state institutions and legal protections (Chambers, 2013). These communities often lack formal citizenship documentation, land rights, and representation in parliament, further limiting their political agency and deepening social inequality.

### **Patterns of Political Participation**

Thailand's political participation is characterized by contrasting dynamics of high voter turnout and periodic mass mobilizations, alongside institutional constraints and coercive laws that inhibit broader engagement. The nature and quality of participation differ significantly across demographic, economic, and geographic lines, shaped by both enabling and restrictive structures.

#### **1. Electoral Participation**

Thailand has generally exhibited high levels of voter turnout in national elections. However, disaggregation by region, income, and education reveals notable disparities. Voter turnout in the North and Northeast—regions historically marginalized—has been consistently high, often surpassing Bangkok and Southern provinces (Election Commission of Thailand, 2019). This is partly attributed to the political mobilization efforts of populist parties such as Thai Rak Thai and Pheu Thai, which resonated with rural voters through welfare-oriented platforms (Walker, 2012).

Socioeconomic status also plays a critical role. Lower-income and less-educated voters participate in elections at high rates, but their choices are frequently shaped by patron-client networks and vote-buying mechanisms. Political scientists have noted that vote buying remains prevalent in rural constituencies, where financial inducements are normalized as part of reciprocal obligations (Callahan, 2000). While often seen as undermining democratic ideals, others argue that these exchanges reflect localized forms of political engagement rooted in everyday survival and political brokerage (Pasuk & Baker, 2009).

#### **2. Non-Electoral Engagement**

Beyond the ballot box, non-electoral participation in Thailand has been dynamic but also polarized. Protest movements, such as the **Red Shirts** (United Front for Democracy Against Dictatorship, UDD), emerged in response to elite

domination and military interventions, demanding electoral justice and inclusive democracy. Conversely, movements like the **Yellow Shirts** and **People's Democratic Reform Committee (PDRC)** reflected middle-class disillusionment with populist rule, advocating for political reform often through undemocratic means (McCargo & Ukrist, 2005; Montesano et al., 2012).

More recently, student-led movements during 2020–21 introduced new forms of dissent, including symbolic protests and demands for monarchy reform. These youth-led actions marked a generational shift in political consciousness, utilizing digital platforms like Twitter and TikTok to circumvent state-controlled narratives (Sinpeng, 2021). However, the **digital divide** persists, with rural populations and older citizens less able to access or leverage online spaces for political engagement (UNDP, 2021).

Thailand's legal environment remains repressive, limiting non-electoral participation. Laws such as **Article 112** (lèse majesté), protest bans under emergency decrees, and sedition charges have been used to suppress dissent and silence activists. These legal tools not only chill public discourse but systematically disempower critical voices, especially among youth, journalists, and minority groups (Human Rights Watch, 2022).

### 3. Institutional and Structural Barriers

Institutional obstacles further restrict meaningful political participation. **Gerrymandering** and electoral engineering—especially under the 2017 Constitution—have diluted opposition representation by favoring small parties and pro-military coalitions (Chambers & Waitookiat, 2020). The **military's entrenched influence**, via reserved Senate appointments and constitutional veto points, skews the democratic process.

Judicial interventions have also played a decisive role in shaping electoral outcomes. Courts have disbanded multiple reformist and opposition parties, including Thai Raksa Chart in 2019 and Future Forward in 2020, undermining the representational integrity of the electoral system (Dressel & Khemthong, 2020). These actions reflect an enduring pattern of **judicialization of politics**, where courts act as political arbiters rather than neutral institutions. Furthermore, **access to decision-making remains elite-dominated**. Despite decentralization efforts, local governance often lacks genuine autonomy, with central agencies retaining fiscal and legal control. Marginalized communities, including ethnic minorities and the urban poor, are systematically excluded from policy-making forums and legislative representation (UNDP, 2021).

### Policy Recommendations

Addressing the intertwined challenges of social inequality and political exclusion in Thailand requires a multifaceted approach that enhances citizen agency, democratizes institutional structures, and protects political freedoms. The following policy recommendations aim to promote inclusive political participation and support democratic deepening.

### **1. Civic Education Reforms Targeting Underprivileged Communities**

One of the foundational strategies for enhancing political participation is the reform of civic education to prioritize inclusivity and critical engagement. Current curricula often emphasize passive obedience and nationalistic values rather than active citizenship (UNESCO, 2015). A reoriented civic education model—especially tailored for underprivileged communities in the Northeast, Deep South, and ethnic minority regions—should include modules on democratic rights, critical media consumption, and mechanisms of political accountability.

Programs modeled on participatory education frameworks can empower marginalized youth and adults to better understand political processes, thus enabling informed and sustained engagement (Kerr, 1999). Such reforms would also help counter clientelistic practices by promoting political efficacy and issue-based voting.

### **2. Electoral System Redesign for Proportionality and Access**

Thailand's mixed electoral system has been criticized for fragmenting opposition forces and favoring entrenched elites, especially under the 2017 Constitution which weakened party-list proportionality (Chambers & Waitoolkiat, 2020). A redesign of the electoral framework to enhance proportionality—such as increasing the weight of party-list seats—could ensure fairer representation of minority and reformist voices. Moreover, improving accessibility for underrepresented populations through mobile polling units, multilingual ballots for ethnic minorities, and easier voter registration processes would mitigate barriers faced by rural, disabled, and undocumented citizens (UNDP, 2021).

### **3. Investment in Media Literacy and Regional Infrastructure**

Political participation is deeply shaped by the ability to access and assess information. Bridging the digital divide—which marginalizes rural and poor communities from online political discourse—requires public investment in broadband infrastructure and digital tools, especially in provinces outside Bangkok and tourist hubs (Sinpeng, 2021).

Complementing infrastructure development, media literacy initiatives are essential to help citizens navigate disinformation, partisan news, and propaganda. Integrating media analysis skills into school curricula and community training programs would foster more resilient and informed democratic engagement (Wardle & Derakhshan, 2017).

### **4. Strengthening Civil Society and Legal Protections for Participation**

An enabling environment for civil society is critical to fostering participation beyond electoral cycles. The Thai state should revise restrictive laws such as the Public Assembly Act and narrow interpretations of Article 112 (*lèse majesté*) that are often used to suppress dissent and criminalize peaceful activism (Human Rights Watch, 2022).

Furthermore, policies that support grassroots organizations—including funding, legal status recognition, and capacity-building—are vital to amplify the voices of marginalized groups and sustain political mobilization. Building alliances between NGOs, student movements, and local advocacy groups can counterbalance state power and create more participatory public spheres (Carothers & Brechenmacher, 2014).

## Conclusion

Thailand's democratic development continues to be constrained by deeply rooted social inequalities that manifest across economic, educational, regional, and institutional dimensions. These disparities significantly shape patterns of political participation, privileging some citizens while marginalizing others. Although electoral participation in Thailand remains relatively high, it is often mediated by clientelistic structures and unequal access to political information and institutions. Non-electoral engagement, including protest and digital activism, has surged in recent years—particularly among youth—but faces growing repression through restrictive laws and authoritarian interventions.

Institutional arrangements such as gerrymandering, judicial partisanship, and military dominance further compound these challenges by systematically excluding reformist and marginalized voices. The result is a fragmented and uneven democratic space where participation is both stratified and contested.

Addressing these issues requires comprehensive reforms aimed at reducing structural barriers and fostering inclusive civic engagement. Key policy recommendations include targeted civic education for underserved communities, redesigning the electoral system for proportional representation, expanding regional infrastructure and media literacy, and safeguarding civil liberties through legal and institutional protections.

Ultimately, a more participatory and equitable democracy in Thailand depends on the ability of state and civil society actors to bridge social divides, empower excluded populations, and institutionalize democratic norms that transcend elite interests. Only through such inclusive transformation can Thailand realize the full potential of its democratic aspirations.

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