

# Political Identity and Social Change in Contemporary Thai Society<sup>\*</sup>

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## Abstract

This article examines the intersection of political identity and social change in contemporary Thai society, focusing on how regional, generational, and ideological identities have emerged as catalysts for democratic reform. It explores the historical foundations of identity formation, the rise of regional consciousness in Isaan, generational conflicts over monarchy and national narratives, and the development of progressive political movements. Despite growing public mobilization, efforts at transformation are constrained by entrenched elite structures—namely, military coups, judicial interventions, and monarchical dominance. The article concludes by identifying potential pathways for inclusive reform, including inter-regional alliances, youth engagement, and legal restructuring. This study contributes to a deeper understanding of identity politics in semi-authoritarian contexts and highlights the transformative potential of collective political agency in Thailand.

**Keywords:** Political Identity, Social Change, Democratization, Monarchy Reform, Thailand

## Introduction

Political identity in the Thai context refers to the self-conception and group affiliation of individuals or communities based on shared political beliefs, regional loyalties, historical experiences, social status, or ideological orientations. It encompasses allegiances to specific political ideologies, parties, or movements, and is often shaped by deeper socio-cultural undercurrents such as ethnicity, religion, and class structure (Connors, 2007). Meanwhile, **social change** in Thailand includes the transformation of societal values, political institutions, and power relations, driven by such factors as democratization efforts, economic development, and citizen mobilization (McCargo, 2005). In Thailand, political identity and social change are intricately interwoven, with identity-based movements playing a central role in demanding or resisting structural reforms.

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Thailand has undergone repeated cycles of democratization and authoritarian regression since the end of the absolute monarchy in 1932. The *People's Party Revolution* in that year introduced a constitutional framework, but military coups and autocratic governance have remained recurrent features of Thai political life. These fluctuations have continually reshaped political identities—especially along lines of region (e.g., the rise of Isaan regional consciousness), generation (e.g., the youth-led protests of 2020–2021), and ideology (e.g., the liberal-progressive agendas of parties like Future Forward and Move Forward) (Dressel & Khemthong, 2024; ISEAS, 2024). Thailand's political development, therefore, cannot be understood without addressing how these identities are formed, mobilized, and challenged over time.

This article investigates the dynamic interplay between **political identity** and **social change** in Thailand's contemporary setting. It seeks to answer two central research questions:

1. How do political identities—regional, class-based, generational, and ideological—evolve in Thailand's shifting political landscape?
2. What impact do these evolving identities have on broader processes of social change, such as democratization, legal reform, or civic participation?

By engaging with these questions, the study contributes to understanding how identity politics fuels both progressive mobilization and reactionary backlash within Thai society, especially under an unstable democratic framework. The article draws on historical analysis, case studies of political movements, and recent protest waves to contextualize the reconfiguration of Thai political identities and their transformative potential.

## Historical Foundations

### 1. Nation-Building and Thaification

Thailand's project of nation-building in the 20th century was deeply shaped by the state's effort to cultivate a cohesive national identity, known as “Thainess” (khwampenthai). This project was largely pursued through “Thaification” (การทำให้เป็นไทย), a series of cultural and political strategies implemented particularly during the reign of Field Marshal Phibun Songkhram (1938–1944 and 1948–1957). Thaification policies aimed to assimilate or suppress the diverse ethnic and cultural identities within the country—including Isaan Lao communities, Malay Muslims in the South, ethnic Chinese, and hill tribes in the North—in favor of a centrally-defined Thai Buddhist identity (Winichakul, 1994; Jory, 2000).

These policies included mandatory use of the Thai language, Thai-script signage, centralized education curricula, state-led rituals, and legal prohibitions on non-Thai languages in official settings. For instance, in the Isaan region, which shares strong cultural ties with Laos, speaking Lao dialects in school was discouraged or punished, and local traditions were often labeled as backward (McCargo & Hongladarom, 2004). Ethnic Chinese were pressured to adopt Thai surnames and

integrate into Thai society, especially during Cold War-era fears of communist infiltration (library.fes.de). These assimilationist policies not only marginalized ethnic identities but also laid the foundation for region-based political grievances that persist today.

Such strategies reflect the broader ideological goal of creating a unified Thai nation-state capable of resisting colonial encroachment and internal dissent. However, the legacy of Thaification is a double-edged sword: while it helped consolidate the Thai state, it also entrenched ethnic and regional divisions, fueling future identity-based mobilizations.

## **2. Student and Peasant Movements of the 1970s**

The 1970s marked a pivotal era in the formation of modern political identity in Thailand, driven by grassroots mobilizations, especially among students and peasants. The 1973 student uprising, culminating in the October 14th incident, was a landmark moment that ended the military dictatorship of Thanom Kittikachorn and ushered in a brief democratic period. The uprising was led primarily by middle-class university students from institutions like Thammasat University and Chulalongkorn University, who challenged authoritarianism and demanded constitutional reform, press freedom, and democratic participation (Wikipedia, 2023).

Simultaneously, peasant movements—especially in the Northeast—organized around issues such as land reform, unfair tenancy, and exploitative landlords. The Farmers Federation of Thailand (FFT), established in the early 1970s, became a platform for rural mobilization. The FFT organized thousands of farmers to demand land rights and lower land rents, often facing threats, assassination, and violent suppression. These movements represented a clear shift in political identity among rural populations, who began to view themselves not just as subjects of the state, but as rights-bearing citizens with collective interests (Morell & Samudavanija, 1981).

Together, the student and peasant movements highlighted class-based grievances and laid the groundwork for later regional and ideological mobilizations, such as the Red Shirt movement in the 2000s. These events also forged a culture of resistance that continues to shape the political consciousness of younger generations and rural constituencies alike.

## **Regional Identity and Political Mobilization**

### **1. The Rise of Isaan Identity**

In recent decades, Isaan, the northeastern region of Thailand, has undergone a remarkable transformation in regional political identity. Historically marginalized through state-led Thaification policies and excluded from the economic development concentrated in Bangkok and the Central Plains, Isaan communities have developed a strong sense of regional consciousness, rooted in their Lao-influenced culture, dialect (Phasa Lao), and shared experience of socio-economic exclusion (McCargo & Hongladarom, 2004).

While once viewed as peripheral, Isaan has emerged as a politically significant bloc, particularly during the rise of Thaksin Shinawatra in the early 2000s. Thaksin's populist policies—such as universal healthcare and village funds—resonated deeply with the rural poor, especially in Isaan. As a result, the region became a key support base for the Red Shirt movement (United Front for Democracy Against Dictatorship - UDD), which mobilized millions of rural and working-class citizens in defense of electoral democracy and against military-backed elites (TIME, 2014; Wikipedia, 2023a).

The assertion of Isaan identity through political mobilization represents a significant break from the past. Where once Isaan was seen as politically dormant or easily co-opted, it now serves as a symbol of rural empowerment, democratic legitimacy, and resistance to Bangkok-centric elitism. The Red Shirt protests of 2010–2014, though violently suppressed, cemented Isaan's role in shaping the national political discourse.

## **2. Red Shirts vs. Yellow Shirts**

Thailand's political conflicts in the 21st century have been deeply shaped by the dichotomy between the Red Shirts and Yellow Shirts, whose contrasting political identities reflect broader class and regional divides.

The Red Shirts, aligned with Thaksin Shinawatra and subsequent parties such as Pheu Thai, emerged as a populist movement rooted in rural regions (especially Isaan and the North), the urban working class, and those demanding electoral representation. They framed their struggle as a fight for democratic legitimacy, opposing the repeated nullification of elections by military coups and judicial interventions (Pye & Schaffar, 2008).

In contrast, the Yellow Shirts, organized under the People's Alliance for Democracy (PAD), represented Bangkok's middle class, royalists, military elites, and sections of the urban intelligentsia. They accused Thaksin and his allies of corruption and populist authoritarianism, often invoking loyalty to the monarchy and traditional values to justify their actions. The Yellow Shirts supported unelected bodies and judicial interventions as safeguards against what they saw as the “tyranny of the majority” (ResearchGate, 2013; Wikipedia, 2023b).

This Red–Yellow conflict is not merely political—it reveals the deep socio-economic and cultural polarization in Thai society:

- Urban vs. rural
- Central vs. regional (especially Isaan)
- Elitist technocracy vs. mass electoral populism

The antagonism between these movements set the stage for political instability, repeated military coups (e.g., 2006, 2014), and the erosion of democratic institutions. Yet, it also shows how political identity rooted in region, class, and ideology has become a driving force for civic engagement and contestation in Thailand.

## Urban Youth and Generational Shifts

### 1. Student-led Pro-democracy Protests (2020–21)

One of the most profound political developments in contemporary Thai society has been the youth-led pro-democracy protests of 2020–2021, spearheaded primarily by high school and university students. Sparked by the dissolution of the Future Forward Party in February 2020, and later intensified by the COVID-19 economic fallout and perceived government incompetence, these protests evolved into a mass movement demanding systemic change—not only in governance but in the role of the monarchy. Young protesters, many of whom were born after the 2006 and 2014 coups, organized under decentralized networks such as the Free Youth Movement and United Front of Thammasat and Demonstration. They publicly called for the resignation of Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha, the drafting of a new constitution, and—most provocatively—reform of the monarchy under Section 112 (Thailand's lèse-majesté law) (Wikipedia, 2023).

What distinguished this movement was not only its radical demands but also its use of digital media, satire, and cultural references. Youth protestors appropriated memes, anime, and pop-culture symbols (such as *Harry Potter*, *The Hunger Games*, and K-pop fan culture) to critique authoritarianism and elite privilege. Flash mobs, online forums like Twitter (#มกฉ 112), and encrypted messaging platforms became tools for mobilization, while protest art, music, and cosplay events created a new language of dissent (Numnonda, 2022).

This cultural rupture represented a break from earlier, more deferential protest traditions. It also marked a shift from political expression based on regional or class identity toward one anchored in generational experience, digital fluency, and demands for institutional accountability.

### 2. Generational Contestation Over National Narratives

The youth-led protests also ignited a broader generational conflict over national identity and historical memory. Traditional Thai state narratives, long shaped by royalist-nationalist historiography, portray the monarchy as the cornerstone of national unity, and the military as its guardian. These views are widely disseminated through textbooks, education, and state media.

However, younger Thais are increasingly challenging these narratives, questioning the sanctity of the monarchy, the legitimacy of repeated military coups, and the erasure of dissenting voices in Thai history. Online campaigns have demanded revisions to school curricula that glorify kings and generals while omitting events such as the 1976 Thammasat University massacre or the role of the monarchy in political interventions.

This intergenerational rift is more than symbolic—it is political. While older generations (especially those shaped by Cold War-era propaganda) often prioritize stability and hierarchical order, younger cohorts call for transparency, decentralization, and civic empowerment (Aim Sinpeng, 2021). Their activism reflects a redefinition of

Thainess, where identity is no longer tied to obedience and loyalty, but to democratic participation and human rights.

Thus, the political identity of Thailand's urban youth is both a rejection of authoritarian traditions and a vision of a new social contract, grounded in pluralism, equality, and critical engagement with the past.

## **Ideological and Political Organizations**

### **1. Emergence of Ideological Cleavages**

Contemporary Thai politics is increasingly shaped by deep ideological polarization that transcends traditional divisions of class and region. These ideological cleavages reflect competing visions of Thailand's political future, particularly along the lines of populism vs. neoliberalism, and monarchical absolutism vs. constitutional reform.

On one end of the spectrum, populist movements, exemplified by Thaksin Shinawatra's Thai Rak Thai and its successors, have emphasized redistributive policies, rural development, and inclusive welfare. These policies garnered mass support from rural constituencies and urban working-class populations, especially in Isaan and the North (Hewison, 2010).

On the other hand, neoliberal technocratic elites—often aligned with military regimes or judiciary-backed governments—have promoted austerity, centralization, and stability over redistributive justice. These groups typically claim moral authority to “protect” the monarchy and national order, justifying their actions through anti-corruption discourse and nationalism (Connors, 2021).

The most contentious ideological divide, however, centers on the role of the monarchy in Thailand's political system. While conservative forces treat the monarchy as an inviolable institution above politics, reformist factions—especially among youth and progressive parties—have openly called for constitutional reform and accountability, challenging the long-standing taboo surrounding royal critique (TIME, 2020; Wikipedia, 2023a). This contestation has become the ideological fault line driving protest movements and reshaping electoral politics.

### **2. Progressive Parties and Social Democracy**

The past decade has seen the emergence of progressive parties that explicitly campaign on platforms of social democracy, decentralization, civil rights, and military reform. Central to this evolution has been the trajectory from Future Forward Party (FFP) to the Move Forward Party (MFP) and the Progressive Movement.

- Future Forward Party, founded in 2018 by Thanathorn Juangroongruangkit and Piyabutr Saengkanokkul, captured the imagination of young voters with its critique of military dominance, advocacy for judicial and bureaucratic reform, and bold stance on reducing military budgets and decentralizing power. Despite winning over 6.2 million votes in the 2019 election, the party was controversially dissolved by the Constitutional

Court in early 2020, which many viewed as politically motivated suppression (Wikipedia, 2023b).

- Following FFP's dissolution, its successor, the Move Forward Party (MFP), assumed its parliamentary role and maintained its progressive agenda. MFP notably supported monarchy reform by proposing amendments to the lèse-majesté law (Section 112), and championed labor rights, environmental regulation, and transparent governance (gala.gre.ac.uk; TIME, 2023).
- Outside parliament, former FFP leaders launched the Progressive Movement, a social and political advocacy group that continues to mobilize local activists, contest local elections, and promote democratic education and constitutional reform.

Together, these entities embody a new progressive political identity in Thailand—one that is urban, youth-driven, reformist, and grounded in democratic socialism. Their rise signals not only a generational shift but also a growing demand for structural transformation beyond electoral politics.

### **Intersection of Identity & Social Transformation**

The convergence of regional, generational, and ideological identities in contemporary Thailand has become a powerful catalyst for social transformation, particularly in demands for constitutional rewriting, decentralization of power, reform of the monarchy, and reduction of inequality.

#### **1. Constitutional Rewriting**

One of the most prominent demands arising from identity-based political mobilization is the call for a new democratic constitution. The current 2017 Constitution—drafted under military rule—has been widely criticized for entrenching military power, enabling unelected Senate control, and suppressing popular representation. Regional and generational identities intersect here: rural Red Shirt-aligned regions (e.g., Isaan) demand electoral justice, while urban youth advocate for structural reforms that reflect pluralism and accountability (Wikipedia, 2023a).

Young Thais, particularly those engaged in the 2020–2021 protests, have framed the constitution as a symbol of authoritarian legacy, and constitutional reform as essential for democratization. This reflects a generational political identity grounded in participatory rights, equality before the law, and freedom of expression.

#### **2. Decentralization of Power**

Regional political identity, especially in Isaan and the Deep South, has long clashed with Bangkok-centric governance. Centralized control over budgets, education, and administration has contributed to economic disparity and cultural alienation. Demands for decentralization—including elected provincial governors, local budgetary autonomy, and linguistic rights—are grounded in a belief that political agency must be redistributed from the elite capital to the periphery (McCargo & Hongladarom, 2004).

Decentralization also overlaps with ideological demands for democratic reform. Progressive parties and civil society organizations have pushed for empowered local governance as a path to both efficiency and justice.

### **3. Monarchy Reform**

One of the most controversial and transformative intersections of identity and political demand is the call for monarchy reform. This is driven primarily by a new generation of activists who question the absolute reverence traditionally accorded to the monarchy and seek constitutional limits on royal power. The protests of 2020–2021 broke longstanding taboos by issuing 10-point reform proposals, including fiscal transparency of royal assets, abolition of *lèse-majesté* laws (Section 112), and ensuring the monarchy remains under the constitution (Wikipedia, 2023b).

These demands are rooted in an ideological identity that champions equality, republicanism, and open political discourse—challenging the symbolic and legal architecture of hierarchical Thai society.

### **4. Inequality Reduction**

Finally, identity politics in Thailand has been a driver of demands to reduce economic and social inequality, which remains among the highest in Asia. Populist identity (e.g., Red Shirt support for Thaksin) foregrounds welfare and redistribution, while progressive identity advocates for systemic change—from land reform to labor rights to taxing wealth.

The convergence of class-based, regional, and generational concerns has transformed inequality from a technical policy issue into a core political demand. These identities frame inequality not just as economic disparity but as a structural injustice tied to authoritarianism, privilege, and exclusion.

## **Challenges and Prospects**

### **Structural Constraints on Identity-Based Reform**

Despite growing momentum behind identity-based movements—whether regional, generational, or ideological—Thailand's sociopolitical transformation faces formidable structural obstacles. Three primary institutional mechanisms have historically undermined progressive reform efforts: military coups, judicial interventions, and monarchical dominance.

#### **1. Military Coups**

Thailand has experienced over a dozen coups since 1932. These military takeovers have consistently disrupted democratic progress, dissolved elected governments, and imposed authoritarian constitutions that entrench elite rule. The 2006 and 2014 coups—targeting Thaksin-aligned parties and progressive coalitions—demonstrated how the military functions as a guardian of the status quo, resisting redistributive or democratic reforms often associated with marginalized political identities (Connors, 2021).



## **2. Judicial Interventions**

The Constitutional Court and other judicial bodies have frequently been used to dismantle opposition parties and suppress reformist agendas. The dissolution of the Future Forward Party in 2020 is a prominent example. Critics argue that Thailand's judiciary lacks independence and acts in concert with conservative elites to neutralize electoral threats, thereby undermining the legitimacy of identity-driven democratic movements (Sinpeng, 2021).

## **3. Monarchical Dominance**

Although constitutionally symbolic, the Thai monarchy wields extra-constitutional influence through its cultural sanctity, economic assets (e.g., Crown Property Bureau), and informal ties to the military and judiciary. This has created a monarcho-military alliance that resists any attempt at institutional accountability. The criminalization of critique through lèse-majesté laws (Section 112) has further curtailed free speech and reformist discourse, particularly among youth and progressives (Taylor & Francis Online, 2022).

These interlocking constraints form a resilient elite governance structure that limits the scope of institutional change, despite widespread public mobilization.

## **Prospects and Avenues for Depolarization**

While the structural constraints are significant, several avenues for democratic renewal and depolarization remain open:

### **1. Inter-Regional Alliances**

Building coalitions across traditionally polarized regions—such as between Isaan rural voters and urban youth activists—can challenge Bangkok-centric narratives and create a broader democratic front. Shared grievances over inequality, exclusion, and state violence offer common ground for collective action.

### **2. Youth Engagement and Political Education**

The rise of politically engaged youth signals long-term potential for transformation. Schools, universities, and civic groups can serve as platforms for critical citizenship education, fostering cross-generational dialogue and promoting political literacy beyond partisanship.

### **3. Legal and Constitutional Reform**

Incremental legal changes—such as amending Section 112, strengthening judicial independence, or implementing local governance reforms—can institutionalize space for diverse political identities. Though currently obstructed, sustained public pressure and international advocacy may help reopen reform windows in the future (Taylor & Francis Online, 2023).

These pathways do not offer immediate solutions, but they present strategic entry points for reshaping Thailand's political landscape toward inclusivity and justice.

## Conclusion

The transformation of political identity in contemporary Thai society—across regional, generational, and ideological lines—has become central to understanding the country’s evolving political and social dynamics. From the rise of **Isaan regionalism** and rural populism, to the **emergence of youth-led demands for monarchy reform**, to the consolidation of **progressive political forces** like the Move Forward Party, Thailand’s identity landscape is increasingly pluralistic, assertive, and politically engaged.

These identities have fueled powerful **calls for structural change**, including demands for constitutional rewriting, decentralization, monarchy reform, and socioeconomic equity. While such mobilizations represent democratic vitality, they have also provoked entrenched resistance from Thailand’s **traditional power centers**, particularly the military, judiciary, and monarchy. These institutions act as gatekeepers of the existing order, using both legal mechanisms and ideological narratives to contain transformative pressures.

Nonetheless, the enduring political participation of youth, the assertiveness of marginalized regions, and the ideological maturation of reformist movements suggest that **Thailand is at an inflection point**. The path forward will likely involve ongoing contestation—but also potential for **constructive renegotiation of the social contract**, provided that space for dialogue, coalition-building, and legal reform can be preserved or expanded.

In sum, political identity in Thailand is no longer a passive reflection of state-imposed narratives. It is a **contested and evolving force**, actively shaping and being shaped by movements for democracy, justice, and inclusion. Recognizing and engaging these identities as legitimate political actors will be essential to achieving lasting and equitable social transformation.

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